



The Real Exchange Rate 
and Economic Growth
ABSTRACT I show that undervaluation of the currency (a high real
exchange rate) stimulates economic growth. This is true particularly for devel-
oping countries. This ﬁnding is robust to using different measures of the real
exchange rate and different estimation techniques. I also provide some evi-
dence that the operative channel is the size of the tradable sector (especially
industry). These results suggest that tradables suffer disproportionately from
the government or market failures that keep poor countries from converging
toward countries with higher incomes. I present two categories of explanations
for why this may be so, the ﬁrst focusing on institutional weaknesses, and the
second on product-market failures. A formal model elucidates the linkages
between the real exchange rate and the rate of economic growth.
E
conomists have long known that poorly managed exchange rates can
be disastrous for economic growth. Avoiding signiﬁcant overvaluation
of the currency is one of the most robust imperatives that can be gleaned
from the diverse experience with economic growth around the world, and
one that appears to be strongly supported by cross-country statistical evi-
dence.
1 The results reported in the well-known papers by David Dollar and
by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner on the relationship between outward
orientation and economic growth are largely based on indices that capture
the degree of overvaluation.
2 Much of the literature that derives policy rec-
ommendations from cross-national regressions is now in disrepute,
3 but it
1. Razin and Collins (1997); Johnson, Ostry, and Subramanian (2007); Rajan and Sub-
ramanian (2006).
2. Dollar (1992); Sachs and Warner (1995); Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001).
3. Easterly (2005); Rodrik (2005).
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remains as strong as ever. In his pessimistic survey of the cross-national
growth literature,
4 William Easterly agrees that large overvaluations have
an adverse effect on growth (although he remains skeptical that moderate
movements have determinate effects).
Why overvaluation is so consistently associated with slow growth is not
always theorized explicitly, but most accounts link it to macroeconomic
instability.
5 Overvalued currencies are associated with foreign currency
shortages, rent seeking and corruption, unsustainably large current account
deﬁcits, balance of payments crises, and stop-and-go macroeconomic cycles,
all of which are damaging to growth.
I will argue that this is not the whole story. Just as overvaluation hurts
growth, so undervaluation facilitates it. For most countries, periods of rapid
growth are associated with undervaluation. In fact, there is little evidence
of nonlinearity in the relationship between a country’s real exchange rate
and its economic growth: an increase in undervaluation boosts economic
growth just as powerfully as a decrease in overvaluation. But this relation-
ship holds only for developing countries; it disappears when the sample is
restricted to richer countries, and it gets stronger the poorer the country.
These ﬁndings suggest that more than macroeconomic stability is at stake.
The relative price of tradable goods to nontradable goods (that is, the real
exchange rate) seems to play a more fundamental role in the convergence
of developing country with developed country incomes.
6
I attempt to make the point as directly as possible in ﬁgure 1, which
depicts the experience of seven developing countries during 1950–2004:
China, India, South Korea, Taiwan, Uganda, Tanzania, and Mexico. In
each case I have graphed side by side my measure of real undervaluation
(deﬁned in the next section) against the country’s economic growth rate in
the same period. Each point represents an average for a ﬁve-year window.
To begin with the most fascinating (and globally signiﬁcant) case, the
degree to which economic growth in China tracks the movements in my
index of undervaluation is uncanny. The rapid increase in annual growth of
GDP per capita starting in the second half of the 1970s closely parallels
the increase in the undervaluation index (from an overvaluation of close to
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4. Easterly (2005).
5. See, for example, Fischer (1993).
6. Recently, Bhalla (forthcoming), Gala (2007), and Gluzmann, Levy-Yeyati, and
Sturzenegger (2007) have made similar arguments.
11472-07_Rodrik_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:20 PM  Page 366DANI RODRIK 367












Log units Percent a year
0.25
–0.25
1960 1970 1980 1990
ln UNDERVAL (left scale)
Growth in GDP







Log units Percent a year
0.2




























Log units Percent a year
–0.2
–0.1





11472-07_Rodrik_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:20 PM  Page 367100 percent to an undervaluation of around 50 percent7), and both under-
valuation and the growth rate plateau in the 1990s. Analysts who focus on
global imbalances have, of course, noticed in recent years that the yuan is
undervalued, as evidenced by China’s large current account surplus. They
have paid less attention to the role that undervaluation seems to have
played in driving the country’s economic growth.
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Figure 1. Undervaluation and Economic Growth in Selected Developing Countries,
1950–2004 (Continued)
Sources: Penn World Tables version 6.2, and author’s calculations.
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7. Recent revisions in purchasing power parity indices are likely to make a big differ-
ence to the levels of these undervaluation measures, without greatly affecting their trends
over time. See the discussion below.
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clear-cut, but the basic message is the same as that for China. India’s
growth in GDP per capita has steadily climbed from slightly above 1 per-
cent a year in the 1950s to 4 percent by the early 2000s, while its real
exchange rate has moved from a small overvaluation to an undervaluation
of around 60 percent. In the case of the two East Asian tigers depicted in
ﬁgure 1, South Korea and Taiwan, what is interesting is that the growth
slowdowns in recent years were in each case preceded or accompanied by
increased overvaluation or reduced undervaluation. In other words, both
growth and undervaluation exhibit an inverse-U shape over time.
These regularities are hardly speciﬁc to Asian countries. The next two
panels in ﬁgure 1 depict two African experiences, those of Uganda and
Tanzania, and here the undervaluation index captures the turning points in
economic growth exceptionally well. A slowdown in growth is accompa-
nied by increasing overvaluation, and a pickup in growth is accompanied
by a rise in undervaluation. Finally, the last panel of figure 1 shows a
somewhat anomalous Latin American case, that of Mexico. Here the two
series seem quite a bit out of sync, especially since 1981, when the correla-
tion between growth and undervaluation turns negative rather than posi-
tive. Those familiar with the recent economic history of Mexico will
recognize this to be a reﬂection of the cyclical role of capital inﬂows in
inducing growth in that country. Periods of capital inﬂows in Mexico are
associated with consumption-led growth booms and currency apprecia-
tion; when the capital ﬂows reverse, the economy tanks and the currency
depreciates. The Mexican experience is a useful reminder that there is no
reason a priori to expect a positive relationship between growth and under-
valuation. It also suggests the need to go beyond individual cases and
undertake a more systematic empirical analysis.
In the next section I do just that. First, I construct a time-varying index
of real undervaluation, based on data from the Penn World Tables on price
levels in individual countries. My index of undervaluation is essentially a
real exchange rate adjusted for the Balassa-Samuelson effect: this measure
of the real exchange rate adjusts the relative price of tradables to nontrad-
ables for the fact that as countries grow rich, the relative prices of nontrad-
ables as a group tend to rise (because of higher productivity in tradables).
I next show, in regressions using a variety of ﬁxed-effects panel speciﬁca-
tions, that there is a systematic positive relationship between growth and
undervaluation, especially in developing countries. This indicates that the
Asian experience is not an anomaly. I subject these baseline results to a
series of robustness tests, employing different data sources, a range of alter-
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ascertaining causality is always difﬁcult, I argue that in this instance causal-
ity is likely to run from undervaluation to growth rather than the other way
around. I also present evidence that undervaluation works through its pos-
itive impact on the share of tradables in the economy, especially industry.
Hence developing countries achieve more rapid growth when they are able
to increase the relative proﬁtability of their tradables.
These results suggest strongly that there is something “special” about
tradables in countries with low to medium incomes. In the rest of the paper
I examine the reasons behind this regularity. What is the precise mecha-
nism through which an increase in the relative price of tradables (and
therefore the sector’s relative size) increases growth? I present two classes
of theories that would account for the stylized facts. In one, tradables are
“special” because they suffer disproportionately (that is, compared with
nontradables) from the institutional weakness and inability to completely
specify contracts that characterize lower-income environments. In the
other, tradables are “special” because they suffer disproportionately from
the market failures (information and coordination externalities) that block
structural transformation and economic diversiﬁcation. In both cases, an
increase in the relative price of tradables acts as a second-best mechanism
to partly alleviate the relevant distortion, foster desirable structural change,
and spur growth. Although I cannot discriminate sharply between the two
theories and come down in favor of one or the other, I present some evi-
dence that suggests that these two sets of distortions do affect tradable
activities more than they do nontradables. This is a necessary condition for
my explanations to make sense.
In the penultimate section of the paper, I develop a simple growth model
to elucidate how the mechanisms I have in mind might work. The model is
that of a small, open economy in which the tradable and nontradable sectors
both suffer from an economic distortion. For the purposes of the model,
whether the distortion is of the institutional and contracting kind or of the
conventional market failure kind is of no importance. The crux is the rela-
tive magnitude of the distortions in the two sectors. I show that when the
distortion in tradables is larger, the tradable sector is too small in equilib-
rium. A policy or other exogenous shock that can induce a real deprecia-
tion will then have a growth-promoting effect. For example, an outward
transfer, which would normally reduce domestic welfare, can have the
reverse effect because it increases the equilibrium relative price of trad-
ables and can thereby increase economic growth. The model clariﬁes how
changes in relative prices can produce growth effects in the presence of
370 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
11472-07_Rodrik_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:20 PM  Page 370distortions that affect the two sectors differently. It also clariﬁes the sense
in which the real exchange rate is a “policy” variable: changing its level
requires complementary policies (here the size of the inward or outward
transfer).
I summarize my ﬁndings and discuss some policy issues in the conclud-
ing section of the paper.
Undervaluation and Growth: The Evidence
I will use a number of different indices in what follows, but my preferred
index of under- or overvaluation is a measure of the domestic price level
adjusted for the Balassa-Samuelson effect. This index has the advantage
that it is comparable across countries as well as over time. I compute this
index in three steps. First, I use data on exchange rates (XRAT) and pur-
chasing power parity conversion factors (PPP) from the Penn World
Tables version 6.2 to calculate a “real” exchange rate (RER):
8
where i indexes countries and t indexes ﬁve-year time periods. (Unless
speciﬁed otherwise, all observations are simple averages across years.)
XRAT and PPP are expressed as national currency units per U.S. dollar.
9
Values of RER greater than one indicate that the value of the currency is
lower (more depreciated) than indicated by purchasing power parity. How-
ever, in practice nontradable goods are also cheaper in poorer countries
(through the Balassa-Samuelson effect), which requires an adjustment. So
in the second step I account for this effect by regressing RER on GDP per
capita (RGDPCH):
where ft is a ﬁxed effect for time period and u is the error term. This regres-
sion yields an estimate of β (β ˆ) of −0.24 (with a very high t statistic of
around 20), suggesting a strong and precisely estimated Balassa-Samuelson
effect: when incomes rise by 10 percent, the real exchange rate falls by
around 2.4 percent. Finally, to arrive at my index of undervaluation, I take
the difference between the actual real exchange rate and the Balassa-
Samuelson-adjusted rate:
( ) ln ln , 1 RER RGDPCH f u it it t it =+ ++ αβ
ln ln , RER XRAT PPP it it it = ()
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8. The Penn World Tables data are from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006).
9. The variable p in the Penn World Tables (called the “price level of GDP”) is equiva-
lent to RER. I have used p here as this series is more complete than XRAT and PPP.
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11. See Aguirre and Calderón (2005), Razin and Collins (1997), and Elbadawi (1994)
for some illustrations.
12. International Comparison Program (2007).
where ln  is the predicted value from equation 1.
Deﬁned in this way, UNDERVAL is comparable across countries and
over time. Whenever UNDERVAL exceeds unity, it indicates that the
exchange rate is set such that goods produced at home are relatively cheap
in dollar terms: the currency is undervalued. When UNDERVAL is below
unity, the currency is overvalued. In what follows I will typically use the
logarithmic transform of this variable, ln UNDERVAL, which is centered
at zero and has a standard deviation of 0.48 (ﬁgure 2). This is also the mea-
sure used in ﬁgure 1.
My procedure is fairly close to that followed in recent work by Simon
Johnson, Jonathan Ostry, and Arvind Subramanian.
10 The main difference
is that these authors estimate a different cross section for equation 1 for
each year, whereas I estimate a single panel (with time dummies). My
method seems preferable for purposes of comparability over time. I
emphasize that my deﬁnition of undervaluation is based on price compar-
isons and differs substantially from an alternative deﬁnition that relates to
the external balance. The latter is typically operationalized by specifying a
small-scale macro model and estimating the level of the real exchange rate
that would achieve balance of payments equilibrium.
11
One issue of great signiﬁcance for my calculations is that the World
Bank’s International Comparison Program has recently published revised
PPP conversion factors for a single benchmark year, 2005.
12 In some
important instances, these new estimates differ greatly from those previ-
ously available and on which I have relied here. For example, price levels
in both China and India are now estimated to be around 40 percent above
the previous estimates for 2005, indicating that these countries’ currencies
were not nearly as undervalued in that year as the old numbers suggested
(15 to 20 percent as opposed to 50 to 60 percent). This is not as damaging
to my results as it may seem at ﬁrst sight, however. Virtually all my regres-
sions are based on panel data and include a full set of country and time
ﬁxed effects. In other words, as I did implicitly in ﬁgure 1, I identify the
growth effects of undervaluation from changes within countries, not from
differences in levels across a cross section of countries. So my results
RERit

ln ln ln , UNDERVAL RER RER it it it =− 
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sist of largely one-time adjustments to the estimated price levels of indi-
vidual countries, without greatly altering their time trends. Even though
the time series of revised PPP estimates are not yet available, preliminary
indications suggest that this will be the case.
In fact, the revised data yield a cross-sectional estimate of β for 2005
that is virtually the same as the one presented above (−0.22, with a t statis-
tic of 11). In other words, the magnitude of the Balassa-Samuelson effect
is nearly identical whether estimated with the new data or the old.
The Baseline Panel Evidence
My dataset covers a maximum of 188 countries and 11 ﬁve-year periods
from 1950–54 through 2000–04. My baseline speciﬁcation for estimating
the relationship between undervaluation and growth takes the following
form:
where the dependent variable is annual growth in GDP per capita. The
equation thus includes the standard convergence term (initial income per
capita, RGDPCHi,t−1) and a full set of country and time dummies (fi and ft).
( ) ln ln , 2 1 growth RGDPCH UNDERVAL it i t it =+ + + − αβ δ f ffu iti t ++,
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11472-07_Rodrik_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:20 PM  Page 373My primary interest is in the value of δ ˆ. Given the ﬁxed-effects frame-
work, what I am estimating is the “within” effect of undervaluation,
namely, the impact of changes in under- or overvaluation on changes in
growth rates within countries. I present regressions with additional covari-
ates, as well as cross-sectional speciﬁcations, in a later subsection.
Table 1 presents the results. When estimated for the panel as a whole
(column 1-1), the regression yields a highly signiﬁcant δ ˆ of 0.017. However,
as columns 1-2 and 1-3 reveal, this effect operates only for developing
countries. In the richer countries in the sample, δ ˆ is small and statistically
indistinguishable from zero, whereas in the developing countries δ ˆ rises to
0.026 and is highly signiﬁcant. The latter estimate suggests that a 50 percent
undervaluation—which corresponds roughly to one standard deviation in
UNDERVAL—is associated with a boost in annual growth of real income
per capita during the same ﬁve-year period of 1.3 percentage points (0.50 ×
0.026). This is a sizable effect. I will discuss the plausibility of this esti-
mate later, following my discussion of robustness tests and theoretical
explanations.
The results in column 1-4 conﬁrm further that the growth impact of
undervaluation depends heavily on a country’s level of development.
When UNDERVAL is interacted with initial income, the estimated coefﬁ-
cient on the interaction term is negative and highly signiﬁcant. The esti-
mated coefﬁcients in column 1-4 indicate that the growth effects of a 
50 percent undervaluation for Brazil, China, India, and Ethiopia at their
current levels of income are 0.47, 0.60, 0.82, and 1.46 percentage points,
respectively. The estimates also imply that the growth effect disappears at
an income per capita of $19,635, roughly the level of Bahrain, Spain, or
Taiwan.
Interestingly, the estimated impact of undervaluation seems to be inde-
pendent of the time period under consideration. When I split the develop-
ing country data into pre- and post-1980 subperiods (columns 1-5 and 1-6),
the value of δ ˆ remains basically unaffected. This indicates that the channel
or channels through which undervaluation works have little to do with the
global economic environment; the estimated impact is, if anything, smaller
in the post-1980 era of globalization, when markets in rich countries were
considerably more open. So the explanation cannot be a simple export-led
growth story.
Robustness: Sensitivity to Outliers
As noted in the introduction, the literature on the relationship between
exchange rate policy and growth has focused to date largely on the delete-
374 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11472-07_Rodrik_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:20 PM  Page 375rious consequences of large overvaluations. In his survey of the cross-
national growth literature, Easterly warns against extrapolating from large
black market premiums for foreign currency, for which he can ﬁnd evi-
dence of harmful effects on growth, to more moderate misalignments in
either direction, for which he does not.
13 However, the evidence strongly
suggests that the relationship I have estimated does not rely on outliers: it
is driven at least as much by the positive growth effect of undervaluation
as by the negative effect of overvaluation. Furthermore, there is little evi-
dence of nonlinearity in either direction.
Figure 3 presents a scatterplot of the data used in column 1-3 of table 1
(that is, developing countries over the entire sample period). Inspection
suggests a linear relationship over the entire range of UNDERVAL and no
obvious outliers. To investigate this more systematically, I ran the regres-
sion for successively narrower ranges of UNDERVAL. The results are
shown in table 2, where the ﬁrst column reproduces the baseline results
from table 1, the second excludes all observations with UNDERVAL < 
−1.50 (that is, overvaluations greater than 150 percent), the third excludes
observations with UNDERVAL < −1.00, and so on. The final column
376 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
13. Easterly (2005).













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3. Growth and Undervaluation in the Developing Country Sample
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Table 2. Impact of Excluding Extreme Observations of the Undervaluation Measurea
Range of UNDERVAL included in sample
Greater Greater Greater Greater Between
than than than than 50%  and
Baseline −150% −100% −50% −25% −50%
Coefﬁcient on   0.026 0.029 0.034 0.034 0.028 0.030
ln UNDERVAL
t statistic (5.84) (6.31) (7.28) (5.46) (4.32) (3.72)
No. of observations 790 786 773 726 653 619
Source: Author’s regressions.
a. See table 1 for details of the speciﬁcation. All estimated coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the
1 percent level.
restricts the range to undervaluations or overvaluations that are smaller
than 50 percent. The remarkable ﬁnding is that these sample truncations
affect the estimated coefﬁcient on ln UNDERVAL very little. The coefﬁ-
cient obtained when I eliminate all overvaluations greater than 25 percent
is nearly identical to that for the entire sample, and the coefﬁcient obtained
when I eliminate all under- and overvaluations above 50 percent is still
highly signiﬁcant. Unlike Álvaro Aguirre and César Calderón, and Ofair
Razin and Susan Collins, I ﬁnd little evidence of nonlinearity in the rela-
tionship between undervaluation and economic growth.
14
Robustness: Different Real Exchange Rate Measures
There are some potential concerns with relying exclusively on UNDER-
VAL as a measure of under- or overvaluation. One issue is the uncertain
reliability of the price-level measures in the Penn World Tables. As I men-
tioned above, the most recent revisions have revealed the estimates to be
problematic in quite a few countries (even though the implications for
changes over time within countries may not be as severe). This suggests
the need to check the validity of my results using real exchange rate series
constructed from other data sources.
Another worry relates to my adjustment for the Balassa-Samuelson
effect. Although this adjustment is proper and introduces no bias when
there is a direct feedback from incomes to price levels as indicated in equa-
tion 1, it may be problematic under some other circumstances. For example,
14. Aguirre and Calderón (2005); Razin and Collins (1997). I have also tried entering
the square of UNDERVAL, distinguishing between positive and negative values of UNDER-
VAL. I ﬁnd some evidence that extreme overvaluations (large negative values of UNDER-
VAL) are proportionately more damaging to growth, but the effect is not that strong, and the
main coefﬁcient of interest remains unaffected.
11472-07_Rodrik_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:20 PM  Page 377if the Balassa-Samuelson effect is created by a third variable (“productiv-
ity”) that affects both income per capita and the price level, the coefﬁcient
estimates on UNDERVAL may be biased upward (as discussed by Michael
Woodford in his comment on this paper). This suggests the need to employ
alternative measures of the real exchange rate that do not incorporate the
Balassa-Samuelson adjustment. Even though estimates from regressions
that use such alternative measures are in turn likely to be biased downward
(in the presence of Balassa-Samuelson effects that operate over time
within countries), such estimates are still useful insofar as they provide a
lower bound on the growth effects of undervaluation.
I therefore use four additional real exchange rate indices in the regres-
sions that follow, to complement the results obtained with UNDERVAL
above. First, I simply use the inverse of the index of the price level from
the Penn World Tables, without the Balassa-Samuelson adjustment:
This measure has all the problems of the Penn World Tables, since it is
constructed from that source, but for purposes of robustness testing it has
the virtue that it is not subject to the sort of bias just mentioned. Next I use
the real effective exchange rate index of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), ln REERIMF, which is a measure of the value of home currency
against a weighted average of the currencies of major trade partners
divided by a price deﬂator or index of costs. This is a multilateral measure
of competitiveness and is available for a large number of industrial and
developing countries, although the coverage is not nearly as complete as
that of the Penn World Tables. The third index is a simple bilateral mea-
sure of the real exchange rate with the United States, constructed using
wholesale price indices:
where E is the home country’s nominal exchange rate against the U.S. dol-
lar (in units of home currency per dollar), PPIUS is the producer price index
for the United States, and WPI is the home country’s wholesale price
index. All of the data are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics
(IFS). Since the IFS does not report wholesale price indices for many
countries, I use as my ﬁnal index a bilateral real exchange rate constructed
using consumer prices:
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11472-07_Rodrik_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:20 PM  Page 378where CPI is the home country’s consumer price index. Note that the lev-
els of the last three measures are not comparable across countries, but this
is of no consequence for the panel regressions, which track the effects of
changes in real exchange rates within countries.
Table 3 reports the results, for the full sample and the developing coun-
try sample separately, of rerunning the baseline speciﬁcation from table 1
(columns 1-1 and 1-3), substituting in turn each of the above measures for
UNDERVAL. The numbers tell a remarkably consistent story, despite the
differences in data sources and in the construction of the index. When the
regression is run on the full sample, the growth impact of a real deprecia-
tion is small and often statistically insigniﬁcant. But when the sample is
restricted to developing countries (again deﬁned as those with real GDP
per capita below $6,000), the estimated effect is strong and statistically
signiﬁcant in all cases. (Only the estimate using REERIMF misses the 5 per-
cent signiﬁcance threshold, and that narrowly.) The coefﬁcient estimates
range between 0.012 and 0.029 (using RERCPI and RERWPI, respectively)
and bracket the estimate with UNDERVAL reported earlier (0.026). Note
in particular that the coefﬁcient estimate with RERPWT is highly signiﬁcant
and, as expected, smaller than the estimate with UNDERVAL (0.016 versus
0.026). It is hard to say how much of this difference is due to the lack of
correction for the Balassa-Samuelson effect (and hence a downward bias
in the estimation when using RERPWT) and how much to the correction of a
previous bias in the estimation with UNDERVAL. Even if the “correct”
estimate is the lower one of 0.016, it still establishes a strong enough rela-
tionship between real undervaluation and economic growth to command
attention: a 50 percent undervaluation would boost annual growth of income
per capita by 0.8 percentage point.
Robustness: Additional Covariates
The speciﬁcations reported thus far are rather sparse, including only a
convergence factor, ﬁxed effects, and the undervaluation measure itself.
Of course, the ﬁxed effects serve to absorb any growth determinants that
are time-invariant and country-speciﬁc, or time-speciﬁc and country-
invariant. But it is still possible that some time-varying country-speciﬁc
determinants correlated with UNDERVAL have been left out. The regres-
sions reported in table 4 therefore augment the baseline speciﬁcation with
additional covariates. I include measures of institutional quality (“rule of
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law”), government consumption, the external terms of trade, inﬂation,
human capital (average years of education), and saving rates.
15 One limita-
tion here is that data for many of the standard growth determinants are not
available over long stretches of time, so that many observations are lost as
regressors are added. For example, the “rule of law” index starts only in
1996. Therefore, rather than include all the additional regressors simulta-
neously, which would reduce the sample size excessively, I tried various
combinations, dropping those variables that seem to enter insigniﬁcantly
or cause too many observations to be lost.
The bottom line is that including these additional regressors does not
make much difference to the coefﬁcient on UNDERVAL. The estimated
coefﬁcient ranges somewhat widely (from a high of 0.063 to a low of
0.016) but remains strongly signiﬁcant throughout, with the t statistic
never falling below 2.8. The variation in these estimates seems to derive in
any case as much from changes in the sample as from the effect of the
covariates. Indeed, given the range of controls considered and the signiﬁ-
cant changes in sample size (from a low of 191 to a high of 790), the
robustness of the central ﬁnding on undervaluation is quite striking. Note
in particular that UNDERVAL remains strong even when the regression
controls for changes in the terms of trade or government consumption (or
both together), or for saving rates, three variables that are among the main
drivers of the real exchange rate (see below).
Robustness: Cross-Sectional Regressions
As a final robustness check, I ran cross-sectional regressions using the
full sample in an attempt to identify the growth effects of undervaluation
solely through differences across countries. The dependent variable here is
the growth rate of each country averaged over a twenty-ﬁve-year period
(1980–2004). Undervaluation is similarly averaged over the same quarter
century, and initial income is GDP per capita in 1980. Regressors include
all the covariates considered in table 4 (except for the terms of trade) along
with dummies for developing country regions as deﬁned by the World Bank.
The results (table 5) are quite consistent with those in the vast empirical
literature on cross-national growth. Economic growth over long time
horizons tends to increase with human capital, quality of institutions, and
15. The data source for most of these variables is the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators. Data for the “rule of law” come from the World Bank governance dataset (Kauf-
mann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2008), and those for human capital (years of education) from
Barro and Lee (2000).
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11472-07_Rodrik_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:20 PM  Page 383saving, and to decrease with government consumption and inﬂation. The
Africa dummy tends to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Interest-
ingly, the Asia dummy is negative and significant in one regression that
controls for saving rates (column 5-6) and not in the otherwise identical
regression that does not (column 5-7). Most important for purposes of this
paper, the estimated coefﬁcient on UNDERVAL is highly signiﬁcant and
virtually unchanged in all these speciﬁcations, ﬂuctuating between 0.019
and 0.022. It is interesting—and comforting—that these coefﬁcient esti-
mates and those obtained from the panel regressions are so similar.
Given the difﬁculty of controlling for all the country-speciﬁc determi-
nants of growth, there are good reasons to distrust estimates from cross-
sectional regressions of this kind. That is why panels with ﬁxed effects are
my preferred speciﬁcation. Nevertheless, the results in table 5 represent a
useful and encouraging robustness check.
Causality
Another possible objection to these results is that the relationship they
capture is not truly causal. The real exchange rate is the relative price of
tradables to nontradables in an economy and as such is an endogenous
variable. Does it then make sense to put it (or some transformation) on the
right-hand side of a regression equation and talk about its effect on growth?
Perhaps it would not in a world where governments did not care about the
real exchange rate and left it to be determined purely by market forces. But
we do not live in such a world: except in a handful of developed countries,
most governments pursue a variety of policies with the explicit goal of
affecting the real exchange rate. Fiscal policies, saving incentives (or dis-
incentives), capital account policies, and interventions in currency markets
are part of the array of such policies. In principle, moving the real exchange
rate requires changes in real quantities, but economists have long known
that even policies that affect only nominal magnitudes can do the trick—
for a while. One of the key ﬁndings of the open-economy macroeconomic
literature is that except in highly inflationary environments, nominal
exchange rates and real exchange rates move quite closely together. Eduardo
Levy-Yeyati and Federico Sturzenegger have recently shown that steril-
ized interventions can and do affect the real exchange rate in the short to
medium term.
16 Therefore, interpreting the above results as saying some-
thing about the growth effects of different exchange rate management
strategies seems plausible.
384 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
16. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007).
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tion and about omitted variables bias. The real exchange rate may respond
to a variety of shocks besides policy shocks, and these may confound the
interpretation of δ. The inclusion of some of the covariates considered in
tables 4 and 5 serves to diminish concern on this score. For example, an
autonomous reduction in government consumption or an increase in domes-
tic saving will both tend to produce a real depreciation, ceteris paribus. To
the extent that such policies are designed to move the real exchange rate in
the ﬁrst place, they are part of what I have in mind when I talk of “a policy
of undervaluation.” But to the extent they are not, the results in tables 4
and 5 indicate that undervaluation is associated with faster economic
growth even when those policies are controlled for.
A more direct approach is to treat UNDERVAL explicitly as an endoge-
nous regressor; this is done in table 6. Note ﬁrst that a conventional instru-
mental variables approach is essentially ruled out here, because it is
difﬁcult to think of exogenous regressors that inﬂuence the real exchange
rate without plausibly also having an independent effect on growth. I will
report results of regressions on the determinants of UNDERVAL in table
10; all of the regressors used there have been used as independent variables
in growth regressions. Here I adopt instead a dynamic panel approach using
the generalized method of moments (GMM) as the estimation method.
17
These models use lagged values of regressors (in levels and in differences)
as instruments for right-hand-side variables and allow lagged endogenous
(left-hand-side) variables as regressors in short panels.
18 Table 6 presents
results for both the “difference” and the “system” versions of GMM. As
before, the estimated coefﬁcients on UNDERVAL are positive and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant for the developing countries (if somewhat at the lower end
of the range reported earlier). They are not signiﬁcant for the developed
countries. Hence, when UNDERVAL is allowed to be endogenous, the
resulting pattern of estimated coefﬁcients is quite in line with the results
reported above, which is reassuring.
It is worth reﬂecting on the sources of endogeneity bias a bit more.
Many of the plausible sources of bias that one can think of would induce a
negative relationship between undervaluation and growth, not the positive
relationship I have documented. So to the extent that endogenous mecha-
nisms are at work, it is not clear that they generally create a bias that works
DANI RODRIK 385
17. I follow here the technique of Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond
(1998).
18. See Roodman (2006) for an accessible user’s guide.
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against my ﬁndings. Economic growth is expected to cause a real appreci-
ation on standard Balassa-Samuelson grounds (which I control for by
using UNDERVAL). Shocks that cause a real depreciation tend to be shocks
that are bad for growth on conventional grounds—a reversal in capital
inﬂows or a terms of trade deterioration, for example. Good news about the
growth prospects of an economy is likely to attract capital inﬂows and thus
bring about a real appreciation. So, on balance, it is unlikely that the posi-
tive coefﬁcients reported here result from the reverse effect of growth on
the real exchange rate.
Evidence from Growth Accelerations
A different way to look at the cross-national evidence is to examine
countries that have experienced noticeable growth accelerations and ask
what happened to UNDERVAL before, during, and after these episodes.
This way of parsing the data throws out a lot of information but has the
virtue that it focuses attention on a key question: have those countries that
managed to engineer sharp increases in economic growth done so on the
back of undervalued currencies?
19
Ricardo Hausmann, Lant Pritchett, and I identiﬁed 83 distinct instances
of growth acceleration in which annual growth in GDP per capita rose by 
2 percentage points or more and the spurt was sustained for at least eight
years.
20 Figure 4 shows the average values of UNDERVAL in each of these
episodes for a 21-year window centered on the year of the acceleration
(the 10-year periods before and after the acceleration plus the year of the
acceleration). The ﬁgure shows some interesting patterns in the trend of
UNDERVAL but is especially telling with respect to the experience of dif-
ferent subgroups.
For the full sample of growth accelerations, a noticeable, if moderate,
decline in overvaluation occurs in the decade before the onset of the growth
spurt. The increase in UNDERVAL is on the order of 10 percentage points
and is sustained into the first five years or so of the episode. Since these
growth accelerations include quite a few rich countries in the 1950s and
1960s, figure 4 also shows results for only those growth accelerations in
the sample that occurred after 1970. There is a much more distinct trend in
UNDERVAL for this subsample: the growth spurt takes place after a decade
of steady increase in UNDERVAL and immediately after the index reaches
its peak value (at an undervaluation of 10 percent). Finally, ﬁgure 4 also
19. A similar exercise was carried out for a few, mostly Asian, countries by Hausmann
(2006).
20. Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005).
11472-07_Rodrik_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:20 PM  Page 387shows results for the Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries separately.
The Asian countries reveal the most pronounced trend, with an average
undervaluation of more than 20 percent at the start of the growth accelera-
tion. Moreover, the undervaluation is sustained into the growth episode,
and in fact it increases further by the end of the decade. In the African
growth accelerations, in contrast, the image is virtually the mirror oppo-
site. Here the typical growth acceleration takes place after a decade of
increased overvaluation, and its timing coincides with the peak of the over-
valuation. As is well known, the Asian growth accelerations have proved
signiﬁcantly more impressive and lasting than African ones. The contrast-
ing behavior of the real exchange rate may offer an important clue as to the
sources of the difference.
Size of the Tradable Sector as the Operative Channel
The real exchange rate is a relative price, the price of tradable goods in
terms of nontradable goods:
An increase in RER enhances the relative profitability of the tradable
sector and causes it to expand (at the expense of the nontradable sector).
RER P P TN = .











Years before or after growth acceleration
20
0
–9 –8 –7 –5 –4 –3 –2 –1 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9
Figure 4. Relative Timing of Undervaluations and Growth Accelerations
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structure of economic activity are an important driving force behind the
empirical regularity I have identiﬁed. I show two things in particular. First,
undervaluation has a positive effect on the relative size of the tradable 
sector, and especially of industrial economic activities. Second, the effects
of the real exchange rate on growth operate, at least in part, through the
associated change in the relative size of tradables. Countries where under-
valuation induces resources to move toward tradables (again, mainly
industry) grow more rapidly.
The ﬁrst four columns in table 7 report standard panel regressions
where ﬁve-year-average sectoral shares (in real terms) are regressed on
income, a complete set of ﬁxed effects, and my measure of undervaluation.
I initially lumped agriculture and industry together in constructing the
dependent variable, since both are nominally tradable, but as these regres-
sions show, they have quite a different relationship with real exchange
rates. Whether measured by its share in GDP or its share in employment,
the relative size of industry depends strongly and positively on the degree
of undervaluation as shown in the ﬁrst two columns.
21 Simply put, under-
valuation boosts industrial activities. Agriculture, on the other hand, does
not have a positive relationship with undervaluation. Its GDP share actu-
ally depends negatively on the undervaluation measure (third column).
This difference may reﬂect the prevalence of quantitative restrictions in
agricultural trade, which typically turn many agricultural commodities into
nontradables at the margin.
The last two columns of table 7 report results of two-stage panel growth
regressions (with, as before, a full set of ﬁxed effects) that test whether the
effect of undervaluation on growth operates through its impact on the rela-
tive size of industry. The strategy consists of identifying whether the com-
ponent of industrial shares directly “caused” by undervaluation—that is,
industrial shares as instrumented by undervaluation—enters positively and
signiﬁcantly in the growth regressions. The answer is afﬁrmative. These
results indicate that undervaluation causes resources to move toward indus-
try and that this shift in resources in turn promotes economic growth.
22
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21. Blomberg, Frieden, and Stein (2005) report some evidence that countries with larger
manufacturing sectors have greater difﬁculty in sustaining currency pegs. But it is not imme-
diately evident which way this potential reverse causality cuts.
22. See also the supporting evidence in Rajan and Subramanian (2006), who ﬁnd that
real appreciations induced by aid inﬂows have adverse effects on the relative growth rate of
exporting industries as well as on the growth rate of the manufacturing sector as a whole.
Rajan and Subramanian argue that this is one of the more important reasons why aid fails to
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magnitudes involved. They break the undervaluation-growth relationship
into two separate links, one from undervaluation to the size of tradables
(that is, industry) and the other from the size of industry to economic growth.
If undervaluation has a potent effect on growth, that is because each of
these two links is estimated to be quite strong. A 50 percent undervalua-
tion is estimated to increase the share of industry in total employment by
2.1 percentage points (0.042 × 0.50), which is quite large given that the
typical share of industry in total employment in developing countries is
around 20 percent. An increase in the industrial employment share is in
turn estimated to raise growth roughly one for one.
Understanding the Importance of the Real Exchange Rate
Why might an increase in the relative price of tradables and the associated
expansion of tradable economic activities have a causal impact on eco-
nomic growth, as my results suggest? There is no generally accepted the-
ory that would explain these regularities in the data.
23 Any such theory
would have to explain why tradables are “special” from the standpoint of
growth. That is the sense in which my results open an important window
on the mechanisms behind the growth process. If the role that tradables
play in driving growth can be understood, it may be possible to identify
policies that will promote (and those that will hamper) growth.
Although any of a large number of stories might account for the role of
tradables, two clusters of explanations deserve attention in particular. One
focuses on weaknesses in the contracting environment, and the other on
market failures in modern industrial production. Both types of explanation
have been common in the growth and development literature, but in the
present context something more is needed. One has to argue that tradables
DANI RODRIK 391
induce growth in recipient countries. Gluzmann, Levy-Yeyati, and Sturzenegger (2007), by
contrast, ﬁnd little role for the tradables channel and argue that real undervaluations promote
growth through redistributions of income that raise domestic saving (and ultimately invest-
ment). However, their argument seems to require that the current account be invariant to the
real exchange rate, which is contradicted by considerable evidence. See also Galvarriato and
Williamson (2008) on the role played by favorable relative prices in the rapid industrializa-
tion of Latin American countries such as Brazil and Mexico after 1870, and Freund and
Pierola (2008) on the signiﬁcance of currency undervaluation in stimulating export surges.
23. In Rodrik (1986) I argued that manipulating the real exchange rate could play a
welfare-enhancing role if this served to improve the internal terms of trade of sectors subject
to dynamic learning externalities. Gala (2007) suggests that undervaluation is good for
growth because activities subject to increasing returns tend to be located in the tradable
rather than the nontradable sector.
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24. North (1990); Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001).
suffer disproportionately from these shortcomings, so that absent a com-
pensating policy, developing economies devote too few of their resources
to tradables and thus grow less rapidly than they should. Real undervalua-
tion can then act as a second-best mechanism for spurring growth of
tradables and for generating more rapid overall economic growth.
The two clusters of explanations are represented schematically in ﬁg-
ures 5 and 6. I discuss them in turn in the rest of this section. The mechan-
ics of how changes in relative prices can generate growth in the presence
of sectorally differentiated distortions is discussed in the following section.
Explanation 1: Bad Institutions “Tax” Tradables More
The idea that poor institutions keep incomes low and explain, at least in
part, the absence of economic convergence is by now widely accepted.
24
Weak institutions reduce the ability of private investors to appropriate the
returns on their investment through a variety of mechanisms: contractual
Figure 5. Undervaluation as a Second-Best Mechanism for Alleviating 
Institutional Weakness
Source: Author’s model described in the text.
AND 
Increase in price of
tradables relative to
nontradables
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Figure 6. Undervaluation as a Second-Best Mechanism for Alleviating Market Failure
Source: Author’s model described in the text.
AND 
Increase in price of
tradables relative to
nontradables











incompleteness, hold-up problems, corruption, lack of property rights, and
poor contract enforcement. The resulting wedge between private and social
returns in turn blunts the incentives for capital accumulation and techno-
logical progress alike.
Now suppose that this problem is more severe in tradables than in non-
tradables. This is a plausible supposition since production systems tend to
be more complex and roundabout in tradables, placing a greater premium
on the ability to specify contracts and on reliable third-party enforcement
of contracts. A barber needs to rely on little more than a few tools, a chair,
and his skill and ingenuity to sell his services. A manufacturing ﬁrm needs
the cooperation of multitudes of suppliers and customers, plus financial
and legal support. When the institutions that foster these relationships are
weak, the result is to impose a higher “tax” on tradables—especially mod-
ern tradables. This results in both a static misallocation of resources that
penalizes tradables, and a dynamic distortion in the form of investment in
tradables that is lower than socially optimal. An increase in the relative
price of tradables can improve static efficiency and enhance growth in
second-best fashion by eliciting more investment in tradables at the margin
(as I will show in the following section).
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industries, presents suggestive evidence on the disproportionate cost borne
by tradables—as a whole or in part—in the presence of weak institutions:
—Across countries, lower quality of institutions (as measured by
indices of the rule of law, contract enforcement, or control of corruption)
is associated with lower ratios of trade to GDP (“openness”).
25
—Across different categories of tradable goods, more “institution-
intensive” tradables are prone to larger effects. Pierre-Guillaume Méon
and Khalid Sekkat ﬁnd that the relationship they identify holds for manu-
factured exports but not for nonmanufactured exports; Priya Ranjan and
Jae Young Lee ﬁnd that the effect is stronger for differentiated goods than
for homogeneous goods.
26
—Institutional weakness interacts with the contract intensity of goods
to play a role in determining comparative advantage. Andrei Levchenko;
Daniel Berkowitz, Johannes Moenius, and Katharina Pistor; and Nathan
Nunn ﬁnd that countries with poor institutions have comparative disad-
vantage in products that are more institutions-intensive, more complex, or
more relationship-intensive.
27
To provide more direct evidence, I used unpublished data kindly pro-
vided by Nathan Nunn to compare directly the contract-intensiveness of
tradables and nontradables. Nunn investigated whether differences in insti-
tutional quality across countries help determine patterns of comparative
advantage.
28 He reasoned that relationship-speciﬁc intermediate inputs,
deﬁned as inputs that are not sold on exchanges or do not have reference
prices,
29 are more demanding of the contractual environment. Nunn used
measures of relationship speciﬁcity for tradables alone, since his main con-
cern was with comparative advantage. But he collected similar data for ser-
vices as well, which are what I use to carry out the tradables-nontradables
comparison.
The top panel of table 8 shows the shares of intermediate goods that are
relationship-speciﬁc in tradables and nontradables industries. (These num-
bers are based on the U.S. input-output tables.) At ﬁrst sight, these numbers
seem to conﬂict with what my argument requires, in that they show that the
394 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
25. See, for example, Anderson and Mercouiller (2002), Rodrik, Subramanian, and
Trebbi (2004), Rigobon and Rodrik (2005), Méon and Sekkat (2006), Berkowitz, Moenius,
and Pistor (2006), and Ranjan and Lee (2004).
26. Méon and Sekkat (2006); Ranjan and Lee (2004).
27. Levchenko (2004); Berkowitz, Moenius, and Pistor (2006); Nunn (2007).
28. Nunn (2007).
29. As in Rauch (1999).
11472-07_Rodrik_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:20 PM  Page 394inputs used in tradables are less relationship-speciﬁc, and hence less demand-
ing of the institutional environment. But this is misleading because it over-
looks the fact that tradables tend to have much higher intermediate input
shares in gross output. This is shown in the middle panel of the table (this
time relying on Brazil’s input-output tables). Putting the two pieces
together yields the results in the bottom panel of table 8, which show that,
on balance, tradable goods rely on relationship-speciﬁc inputs to a much
greater extent. The numbers for the two sets of goods differ by a factor of
between two and three.
Hence the evidence that institutional and contracting shortcomings, the
bane of every developing society, impose a higher “tax” on the tradable
sector than on the nontradable sector is fairly compelling. But if this story
is correct, its implications should also be evident in the growth regressions.
Speciﬁcally, the growth impact of undervaluation should be greater in
those countries where this “taxation” is greatest, namely, the countries
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Table 8. Illustrative Calculations on the Importance of Relationship Speciﬁcity of
Inputs for Traded and Nontraded Goods
Percent
Tradables Nontradables
Tradables use intermediate goods that tend to 
be less relationship speciﬁc . . .
Share of intermediates not sold on exchanges  49.6 75.1
and not reference-priceda
Share of intermediates not sold on exchangesa 87.3 96.4
. . . but tradables rely more on intermediate inputs . . .
Share of intermediates in total output
b 64.3 35.1
Share of interindustry sales in total outputb 58.4 29.4
. . . so, on balance, relationship-speciﬁc 
intermediate goods account for a much
larger share of output in tradables.
Share in gross output of intermediates not  17.9 7.5
sold on exchanges and not reference-priced
c
Share in gross output of intermediates  31.5 9.7
not sold on exchanges
c
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. Unweighted averages, from the U.S. input-output tables, calculated using data provided by Nathan
Nunn, based on Nunn (2007).
b. From the Brazilian input-output tables for 1996, available on the website of the OECD Directorate
for Science, Technology, and Industry (www.oecd.org/sti).
c. Sums of the products of the underlying data in the top two panels weighted by U.S. value-added shares.
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30. For the latest version of these indices see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2008).
with the weakest institutions. Although GDP per capita does track institu-
tional quality closely, it is not a perfect proxy. So the question is whether
one can detect the differential impact in settings with different institutional
environments.
To attempt this more direct test, I used the World Bank governance
indices to divide the countries in the full sample into three subgroups based
on their “adjusted” institutional quality (above average, around average,
and below average).
30 The exercise was conducted as follows. For each
country I took a simple average of the World Bank’s rule of law, govern-
ment effectiveness, regulatory quality, and corruption indices over 1996–
2004 (starting from the earliest year for which these indices are available).
I then regressed these indices on log GDP per capita, generating a pre-
dicted value based on this cross section. Taking the difference between
actual and predicted values, I ranked countries according to their “adjusted”
levels of institutional quality. I then divided the sample into three sub-
groups of equal size.
The middle three columns of table 9 show the results of my benchmark
speciﬁcation when the regression is run for each subgroup separately. (For
comparison, the ﬁrst column repeats the baseline results from column 1-1
of table 1.) The results are broadly consistent with the theoretical expecta-
tion. The positive effect of undervaluation is strongest in the below-average
group and virtually nil in the above-average group. In other words, when
initial income is taken into account, undervaluation works most potently in
those countries where institutions perform the least well. In the last column
in table 9, I instead interact dummies for the subgroups with UNDERVAL
(taking the above-average group as the omitted category), and the results
are very similar.
The analytics of how institutional weakness interacts with undervalua-
tion to inﬂuence growth will be developed further in the next section. But
ﬁrst I turn to the second category of explanations.
Explanation 2: Market Failures Predominate in Tradables
The second hypothesis for why the real exchange rate matters is that
tradables are particularly prone to the market failures with which develop-
ment economists have long been preoccupied. A short list of such market
failures would include
—learning externalities: valuable technological, marketing, and other
information spills over to other ﬁrms and industries;
11472-07_Rodrik_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:20 PM  Page 396—coordination externalities: getting new industries off the ground
requires lumpy and coordinated investments upstream, downstream, or
sideways;
—credit market imperfections: entrepreneurs cannot ﬁnance worth-
while projects because of limited liability and asymmetric information;
—wage premiums: monitoring, turnover, and other costs keep wages
above market-clearing levels, and employment remains low.
These and similar problems can plague all kinds of economic activity in
developing countries, but arguably their effects are felt much more acutely
in tradables. If so, output and investment in tradables will be suboptimal.
A real depreciation would promote capacity expansion in tradables and
increase growth. Note that once again this is a second-best argument for
undervaluation. First-best policy would consist of identifying distinct mar-
ket failures and applying the appropriate Pigovian remedies. Undervalua-
tion is in effect a substitute for industrial policy.
What is the evidence? By their very nature, the types of market failures
listed above are difficult to identify, and so it is practically impossible to
provide direct evidence that some kinds of goods are more prone to these
market failures than others. But the basic hypothesis is quite plausible, and
a close look at the processes behind economic development yields plenty
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Table 9. Institutional Quality and the Impact of Undervaluation on Growtha
Countries where institutional quality is
Above Around Below 
Independent variable average average average
ln initial income −0.031*** −0.036*** −0.017** −0.060*** −0.031***
(−6.67) (−5.59) (−2.32) (−4.73) (−6.90)
ln UNDERVAL 0.017*** 0.004 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.005
(5.21) (1.17) (3.98) (4.42) (1.45)
ln UNDERVAL × 0.019***
around-average (2.86)
institutions
ln UNDERVAL × 0.019**
below-average (2.36)
institutions
No. of observations 1,303 513 434 356 1,303
Source: Author’s regressions.
a. The dependent variable is annual growth in GDP per capita, in percent. Observations are ﬁve-year averages.
All regressions include time and country ﬁxed effects. Robust t statistics are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate
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structural change, investment in new activities, and the acquisition of new
productive capabilities. As countries grow, the range of tradable goods that
they produce expands.
31 Rich countries are rich not just because they pro-
duce traditional goods in greater abundance, but also because they produce
different goods.
32 The market failures listed above are likely to be much
more severe in new lines of production—those needed to increase economy-
wide productivity—than in traditional ones. New industries require “cost
discovery,”
33 learning-by-doing, and complementary economic activities to
get established. They are necessarily risky and lack track records. These
features make them fertile ground for learning and coordination externali-
ties. The recent ﬁndings of Caroline Freund and Martha Pierola are partic-
ularly suggestive in this connection: currency undervaluation appears to
play a very important role in inducing producers from developing coun-
tries to enter new product lines and new markets, and this seems to be the
primary mechanism through which they generate export surges.
34
Discussion
Unfortunately, it is not easy to distinguish empirically between the
two broad hypotheses I have outlined. In principle, if one could identify
the goods that are most affected by each of these two categories of
imperfections—contractual and market failures—one could run a horse
race between the two hypotheses by asking which goods among them are
more strongly associated with economic growth. Nunn’s data are a useful
beginning for ranking goods by degree of contract intensity.
35 Perhaps an
analogous set of rankings could be developed for market failures using the
commodity categorization in Hausmann and Rodrik,
36 which are loosely
based on the prevalence of learning externalities. But ultimately I doubt
that one can make a sufﬁciently ﬁne and reliable distinction among goods
to allow discrimination between the two stories in a credible manner. Rich
countries differ from poor countries both because they have better institu-
tions and because they have learned how to deal with market imperfec-
tions. Producers of tradable goods in developing economies suffer on both
counts.
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31. Imbs and Wacziarg (2003).
32. Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007).
33. Hausmann and Rodrik (2003).
34. Freund and Pierola (2008).
35. Nunn (2007).
36. Hausmann and Rodrik (2003).
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I argued in the previous section that when tradables are affected dispropor-
tionately by preexisting distortions, a real depreciation can be good for
growth. I now develop a simple model to illustrate the mechanics behind
this hypothesis. I will consider an economy in which there exist “taxes” on
both the tradable and the nontradable sectors that drive a wedge between
the private and the social marginal beneﬁts. When the tax on tradables is
larger (in ad valorem terms) than the tax on nontradables, the economy’s
resources will be misallocated, the tradable sector will be too small, and
growth will be suboptimal. Under these circumstances a real depreciation
can promote growth.
Consumption and Growth
In the model, consumers consume a single ﬁnal good, which as shown
below is produced using a combination of tradable and nontradable inputs.
Their intertemporal utility function is time-separable and logarithmic and
takes the form
where ct is consumption at time t and ρ is the discount rate. Maximizing
utility subject to an intertemporal budget constraint yields the familiar
growth equation
where r is the real interest rate (or the marginal product of capital). The
economy’s growth is increasing in r, and this is the feature that I will
exploit in the rest of this section.
Production
I assume that the economy produces the single ﬁnal good using tradable
and nontradable goods (yT and yN, respectively) as the sole inputs. Produc-
tion of the ﬁnal good (y) is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of these two inputs.
In addition, to allow for endogenous growth (while maintaining perfect
competition throughout), I assume that capital produces external economies
in the production of the ﬁnal good. With these assumptions, the production
function of the representative ﬁnal-good producer can be written as follows:
() , 4
11 yky y TN =
−− ϕα α
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exogenous by each ﬁnal-goods producer), and α and 1 −αare the shares of
tradable and nontradable goods, respectively, in the production costs of the
final good (0 < α < 1). For convenience, I choose the exponent on k to 
be a parameter (1 −ϕ ) that will make aggregate output linear in capital—
as will be shown shortly—and which therefore considerably simpliﬁes the
comparative dynamics of the model. I also omit time subscripts to simplify
the notation.
Tradables and nontradables are in turn produced using capital alone and
subject to decreasing returns to scale. These production functions take the
following simple form:
where kT and kN denote the capital stock employed in the tradables and the
nontradables sectors, respectively; θT is the share of total capital employed
in tradables and 0 < θT < 1; and 0 < ϕ < 1. To justify decreasing returns to
capital in the sectoral production functions (that is, ϕ < 1), one can suppose
that there are other, sector-speciﬁc factors of production employed in each
sector that are ﬁxed in supply.
By definition, nontradables that are used as inputs in the final-goods
sector can only be sourced domestically. And since nontradables do not
enter consumption directly,
With respect to tradables, I allow the economy to receive a transfer from
the rest of the world (or to make a transfer to it). Let b stand for the magni-
tude of the inward transfer. Then the material-balances equation in trad-
ables is given by
It will be more convenient to express b as a share γ of total domestic
demand for tradables. That is, b =γ yT. The equality between demand and
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use γ as a shifter that alters the equilibrium value of the real exchange rate.
Using equations 4 through 8, one can express the aggregate production
function as
Net output y ˜ differs from gross output insofar as the economy makes a pay-
ment to the rest of the world for the transfer b (or receives a payment from
it if b is negative). I express this payment in general form, assuming that
it is a share σ of the transfer’s contribution to gross output; that is, σ×
(∂y/∂b) × b =σ×(∂y/∂yT) ×γ yT =σ×(α/yT)y ×γyT = σαγy. Net output y ˜
equals y − σαγy = (1 − σαγ)y. Therefore, using equation 9,
This way of expressing the payment for the transfer allows a wide variety
of scenarios. The transfer’s contribution to net output is maximized when
σ=0, that is, when b is a pure transfer (a grant). The contribution becomes
smaller as σ increases.
Note that the production function ends up being of the Ak type, that is,
linear in capital. This results in an endogenous growth model with no tran-
sitional dynamics. The (net) marginal product of capital r is ∂y ˜/∂− k, or
which is independent of the capital stock but depends on the allocation of
capital between tradables and nontradables, θT, as well as on the net value
of the transfer from abroad.
Since the economy’s growth rate will depend on r, it is important to
know precisely how r depends on θT. Log-differentiating equation 11 with
respect to θT yields
with
In other words, the return to capital is maximized when the share of the
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11472-07_Rodrik_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:20 PM  Page 401the input share of tradables in ﬁnal production (α). This rate of return, and
ultimately the economy’s growth rate, will be suboptimal when tradables
receive a smaller share of capital. I next analyze the circumstances under
which such inefﬁciencies obtain.
Sectoral Allocation of Capital
The allocation of capital between the tradable and the nontradable sec-
tors will depend both on the relative demand for the two goods and on the
relative proﬁtability of producing them. Consider the latter ﬁrst. In equilib-
rium, capital will be allocated such that its (private) value marginal product
is equalized in the two sectors. As discussed previously, I presume that
each sector faces an “appropriability” problem, arising from either institu-
tional weaknesses or market failures or both. I model this by assuming that
private producers can retain only a share 1 −τ i of the value of producing
each good i = T, N. In other words, τT and τN are the effective “tax” rates
faced by producers in their sector. Let the relative price of tradables pT/pN
be denoted by R. This is my index of the “real exchange rate.” The equality
between the value marginal product of capital in the two sectors can then
be expressed as
which simpliﬁes to
This is a supply-side relationship which says that the share of capital allo-
cated to tradables increases with the relative proﬁtability of the tradable
sector. This relative proﬁtability in turn increases with R, τN, and AT and
decreases with τT and AN (remember that ϕ−1 < 0). The SS schedule is
positively sloped between θT and R, as is shown in ﬁgure 7.
Now turn to the demand side. In view of the Cobb-Douglas form of the
production function for the ﬁnal good, the demands for the two intermediate
goods are given by
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11472-07_Rodrik_rev2.qxd  3/6/09  1:20 PM  Page 402This is a demand-side relationship between θT and R and is shown as the
DD schedule in ﬁgure 7. This schedule is negatively sloped since an
increase in R makes tradables more expensive and reduces the demand for
capital in that sector. Note that a reduction in γ (a smaller inward transfer)
shifts this schedule to the right: it increases θT at a given R or increases R at
a given θT.
Equilibrium and Implications
The equilibrium levels of θT and R are given by the point of intersection
of the SS and DD schedules. Several things should be noted about the
nature of this equilibrium. To begin with, suppose that the economy is at
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Figure 7. Allocation of Capital and the Real Exchange Rate in Equilibrium
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such that τT =τ N = 0, then it is relatively easy to conﬁrm that the equilib-
rium is one where θT =α(point 0 in ﬁgure 7). This ensures that the returns
to capital and growth are maximized. Now suppose that τT and τN are posi-
tive but that their magnitude is identical (τT =τ N > 0). One can see from
equation 11 that the equilibrium remains unaffected. As long as the distor-
tion affects tradables and nontradables equally, θT remains at its growth-
maximizing level.
Things are different when τT ≠τ N. Suppose that τT > τN, which I have
argued is the more likely situation. Relative to the previous equilibrium,
this entails a leftward shift in the SS schedule. In the new equilibrium
(point 1 in ﬁgure 7), θT is lower (and R is higher). Because θT < α, the
economy pays a growth penalty as a result of the tradable sector being too
small. Note that the endogenous real depreciation plays a compensatory
role, but only a partial one.
Starting from this new equilibrium (where τT > τN and θT < α), it is
entirely possible that a negative transfer would improve the economy’s
growth. That is because a reduction in γ leads to an increase in the equilib-
rium level of the real exchange rate and moves θT closer to α. In terms of
ﬁgure 7, a fall in γ shifts the DD schedule to the right and causes both R
and θT to rise (point 2). Whether growth also increases ultimately remains
uncertain, because the reduction in γ also has a direct negative effect on
growth (see equation 11). But if σ is sufﬁciently high, one can always gen-
erate cases where this is on balance growth promoting. In such cases, the
real depreciation generated by the negative external transfer becomes a
second-best instrument to offset the growth costs of the differential distor-
tion of tradables.
Policy Implications
The main point of this paper can be stated succinctly. Tradable economic
activities are “special” in developing countries. These activities suffer dis-
proportionately from the institutional and market failures that keep coun-
tries poor. A sustained real depreciation increases the relative proﬁtability
of investing in tradables and acts in second-best fashion to alleviate the
economic cost of these distortions. It speeds up structural change in the
direction that promotes growth. That is why episodes of undervaluation are
strongly associated with more rapid economic growth.
Are my quantitative estimates of the growth effects of undervaluation
plausible? For developing countries my estimates of δ ˆ range from 0.063
404 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
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the last column of table 3) and cluster around 0.020. If one takes the last
number as a central estimate, the implication is that an undervaluation of,
say, 20 percent boosts annual growth by 0.4 percentage point. Can the
channel I have focused on deliver effects of this magnitude? Remember
that the mechanism that generates growth here is structural change. So the
answer obviously depends on the size of the gaps between social marginal
products in tradable (especially industrial) and nontradable sectors. I have
already given some reasons for why these gaps can be quite large. A long
tradition of thought on economic dualism in developing countries takes the
persistence of large differences between marginal products in the advanced,
“formal” parts of the economy (such as industry) and marginal products
elsewhere as the very essence of underdevelopment. Detailed industry stud-
ies carried out recently by the McKinsey Global Institute provide some
striking, if indirect, evidence on the magnitude of these gaps.
37 They ﬁnd
that productivity levels in the most advanced ﬁrms and sectors of develop-
ing economies are not too distant from the frontier in the rich economies.
Since average productivity in these developing economies is a fraction of
that prevailing in the rich economies, the implied intersectoral differences
within developing economies are quite large. This paper’s distinction
between tradable and nontradable sectors maps directly onto this dualistic
structure, since most (nonagricultural) tradable activities in a typical devel-
oping country are formal whereas most nontradable activities (except for
public services) are informal.
38
There is an obvious parallel between the argument I have developed
here and the results presented in a recent paper by Eswar Prasad, Raghuram
Rajan, and Arvind Subramanian,
39 who note that fast-growing developing
countries have tended to run current account surpluses rather than deﬁcits.
DANI RODRIK 405
37. See, for example, McKinsey Global Institute (2001, 2003).
38. A simple ﬁnger exercise can be helpful here. Denote the productivity premium in
industry by ψ and the share of employment in industry by λI. Some straightforward algebra
can establish that the growth effect of reallocating labor to industry in the amount dλI is
given by growth impact = [ψ/(1+ψλI)]dλI. A reasonable assumption on the industrial pre-
mium (at the margin) would be that ψ=50 percent, and a typical industrial share of labor is
λI = 0.20. Note from the second column of table 7 that a 20 percent undervaluation would be
associated with an increase of 0.84 percentage point in industry’s share of total employment
(dλI = 0.042 × 0.2 = 0.0084). Applying the formula, an increase in the industrial labor share
of 0.84 percentage point would be expected to generate additional growth equal to 0.38 per-
centage point, which is virtually identical to the result obtained using the coefﬁcient esti-
mates from the growth regressions (0.4 percentage point).
39. Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2007).
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external ﬁnance, and to the presumption that capital inﬂows supplement
domestic saving and enable more rapid growth.
40 One of the explanations
that Prasad and his coauthors advance is that capital inﬂows cause a real
appreciation and hurt growth through reduced investment incentives in
manufactures. They also provide some evidence on this particular channel.
Even though these authors focus on the costs of overvaluation rather than
the beneﬁts of undervaluation, their concern with the real exchange rate
renders their paper complementary to this one.
A maintained hypothesis in this paper thus far has been that the real
exchange rate is a policy variable. Strictly speaking, this is not true, as the
real exchange rate is a relative price and is determined in general equilib-
rium along with all other relative prices. But governments have a variety of
instruments at their disposal to inﬂuence the real exchange rate, and the
evidence is that they use them. Maintaining a real undervaluation requires
either higher saving relative to investment or lower expenditure relative to
income. This can be achieved through ﬁscal policy (a large structural sur-
plus), incomes policy (redistribution of income to high savers through real
wage compression), saving policy (compulsory saving schemes and pen-
sion reform), capital account management (taxation of capital account
inﬂows, liberalization of capital outﬂows), or currency intervention (build-
ing up foreign exchange reserves). Experience in East Asia as well as else-
where (for example, Tunisia) shows that countries that target the real
exchange rate (that is, follow a policy of “competitiveness”) can have a
fair amount of success.
Table 10 presents some systematic evidence on how policy choices feed
into the real exchange rate and undervaluation. The table shows the results
of regressing UNDERVAL on a series of independent variables in a panel
with ﬁxed effects. The baseline speciﬁcation (column 10-1) includes the
following regressors: the terms of trade, government consumption (as a
percent of GDP), an index of capital account liberalization (KAOPEN), and
a set of dummy variables capturing the exchange rate regime in force.
KAOPEN comes from Menzie Chinn and Hiro Ito and is a continuous
variable designed to capture the extent and intensity of capital controls.
41 It
increases as a country’s capital account regime becomes more liberal.
The exchange rate regime indicators come from Ethan Ilzetzki, Carmen
Reinhart, and Kenneth Rogoff and are entered as separate dummy vari-
406 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
40. Rodrik and Subramanian (forthcoming).
41. Chinn and Ito (2006).
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42 So, for example, the “Crawl or man-
aged ﬂoat” dummy takes the value of one when the country is classiﬁed as
having a currency regime with a preannounced crawl, a de facto crawl, or a
managed ﬂoat and is zero otherwise. The excluded category is the set of
observations with a rigid exchange rate (a ﬁxed peg, a currency board, or a
currency union).
43 The remaining columns in the table augment the base-
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42. Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2008). The data for the indicators are available at
www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/rogoff/ﬁles/ERA_Background_Material.htm.
43. “Crawl or managed ﬂoat” corresponds to categories 2 and 3 in Ilzetzki, Reinhart,
and Rogoff’s (2008) “coarse” classiﬁcation, and “rigid” corresponds to their category 1.
Table 10. Panel Regressions of Undervaluation on Selected Policy and 
Other Variablesa
Regression
Independent variable 10-1 10-2 10-3 10-4
ln terms of trade −0.139*** −0.164*** −0.167*** −0.115***
(−3.52) (−4.14) (−4.09) (−2.86)
Government consumption  −0.793*** −0.680*** −0.519*** −0.045
as share of GDP (−4.35) (−3.53) (−2.61) (−0.23)
Capital account openness  −0.031*** −0.029*** −0.026*** −0.031***
(KAOPEN)
b (−5.70) (−5.39) (−4.56) (−5.98)
Exchange rate regime dummies:
c
Crawl or managed ﬂoat 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.071***
(4.86) (4.64) (4.47) (4.87)
Float 0.027 0.028 0.058* 0.026
(0.85) (0.89) (1.83) (0.82)
Currency in free fall 0.161*** 0.158*** 0.172*** 0.162***
(4.97) (4.86) (5.21) (4.80)
Dual market with missing  0.065 0.067 0.063 0.021
parallel market data (1.12) (1.19) (1.17) (0.39)
Gross domestic saving as  0.310*** 0.355*** 0.492***
share of GDP (3.55) (3.80) (5.10)
FDI inﬂows as share of GDP −0.376*** −0.382***
(−3.11) (−3.04)
ln (1 + inﬂation rate) 0.039
(1.10)
No. of observations 3,153 3,147 2,994 2,757
Source: Author’s regressions.
a. The dependent variable is ln UNDERVAL. All regressions include time and country ﬁxed effects.
See the text for deﬁnitions and sources of capital account openness and classiﬁcations of exchange rate
regimes. Extreme observations are excluded as noted in table 1. Robust t statistics are in parentheses.
Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the *10 percent, **5 percent, or ***1 percent level.
b. From Chinn and Ito (2006). Higher values indicate greater openness.
c. Classiﬁcation of exchange rate regimes is from Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2008). Countries with
a rigid exchange rate regime are the excluded category.
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44. Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2008). It is worth noting that the growth effects of
undervaluation, as detailed earlier in the paper, do not seem to depend on the type of
exchange rate regime the country happens to have at the time. In particular, the results
remain unchanged when the countries whose currencies are in a “free fall” are excluded
from the sample.
line speciﬁcation by adding domestic saving, inﬂation, and foreign direct
investment (FDI) inﬂows as regressors. Among the variables considered,
government consumption, capital account openness, the exchange rate
regime, and inﬂation can be considered direct policy variables, whereas
domestic saving and FDI inﬂows are indirectly affected by policy. The
terms of trade are exogenous for most countries but are expected to have a
determinate effect on the real exchange rate.
The results in table 10 are quite strong. As expected, positive terms of
trade shocks are bad for undervaluation. More important for the present
discussion, fiscal policies, capital account policies, and the choice of
exchange rate regime all have quite signiﬁcant effects on undervaluation.
Increases in government consumption tend to produce a real appreciation,
as do policies that liberalize the capital account. The coefﬁcient on KAOPEN
implies that going from the Chinese level of capital account restrictions in
2006 (KAOPEN =− 1.13) to the Mexican level (KAOPEN = 1.19) is asso-
ciated with a decrease in UNDERVAL of around 7 percent. (Note that these
effects are identiﬁed in these regressions from the variation within coun-
tries, not across countries, and are therefore more credible.) The operative
channel, presumably, is that opening up the capital account invites inﬂows,
which in turn cause the real appreciation. 
The coefﬁcients on the exchange rate regime dummies are also quite
interesting The central ﬁnding here is that regimes in which the exchange
rate is actively managed—crawling pegs or managed ﬂoats—produce
larger undervaluations than do ﬁxed-rate regimes, with a difference of
around 7 percent. Unsurprisingly, periods in which the currency is in a
“free fall” as deﬁned by Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff are also good for
undervaluation.
44 A pure ﬂoat, by contrast, does not seem to generate sig-
niﬁcantly different levels of undervaluation. 
The results in table 10 also show that high saving is good for underval-
uation, whereas FDI inﬂows are bad. Both of these ﬁndings are in line with
theoretical expectations. Finally, the level of inﬂation does not have a
strong association with undervaluation, indicating that undervaluation
need not come at the cost of inﬂation. In short, policy choices, particularly
on the ﬁscal and external fronts, matter, and they do so in the manner sug-
gested by straightforward economic logic.
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second-best in the context of the economic distortions discussed here. One
of the side effects of maintaining a real overvaluation is a surplus on the
current account (or a smaller deﬁcit). This obviously has effects on other
countries. Were all developing countries to follow this strategy, the devel-
oped countries would have to accept living with the corresponding deﬁcits.
This is a major issue of contention in U.S.-China economic relations at
present. Moreover, when some developing countries (for example, the
Asian economies) follow this strategy while others do not, the growth
penalty incurred by the latter becomes larger as their tradable sector shrinks
even further under the weight of Asian competition.
Conceptually, the ﬁrst-best strategy is clear, if fraught with practical
difﬁculties: eliminating the institutional and market failures in question
would do away with the policy dilemmas. But recommending this strategy
amounts to telling developing countries that the way to get rich is to get
rich. A more practical approach is to subsidize tradables production
directly, rather than indirectly through the real exchange rate. Real under-
valuation is equivalent to a production subsidy plus a consumption tax on
tradables. The direct strategy of subsidizing production of tradables
achieves the ﬁrst without the second. Hence it avoids the spillovers to
other countries. A production subsidy on tradables boosts exports and
imports simultaneously (provided the exchange rate, or wages, or both are
allowed to adjust to equilibrate the current account balance) and therefore
need not come with a trade surplus.
However, it goes without saying that production subsidies have their
own problems. Fine-tuning them to address the perceived distortions
would amount to a highly intricate form of industrial policy, with all the
attendant informational and rent-seeking difﬁculties. Even if that were not
a problem, the strategy would come into conflict with existing World
Trade Organization rules that prohibit export subsidies. There is, it appears,
no easy alternative to exchange rate policy.
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Comments and Discussion
COMMENT BY
PETER BLAIR HENRY The real exchange rate is one of the most
important prices in open-economy macroeconomics. In this paper Dani
Rodrik provides a provocative analysis that links this key variable to the
all-important issue of economic growth. In the process of doing so, the
paper delivers at least two central messages. The ﬁrst is empirical: real
exchange rates exert a signiﬁcant impact on economic growth, and devel-
oping countries that systematically undervalue their currencies in real
terms grow faster than their counterparts that do not. The second message
provides a theoretical explanation for the first: developing countries that
systematically undervalue grow faster because undervaluation raises the
rate of return to capital employed in the production of tradable goods by
an amount sufﬁcient to overcome the wide range of institutional problems
that disproportionately affect that sector of the economy.
The paper contains a lot of fertile ground for a discussant: measure-
ment issues, modeling assumptions, and implications of undervaluation for
inﬂation and monetary policy, to name a few. My comment will focus pri-
marily on the persuasiveness of the main results, their interpretation, and
their policy implications.
Regarding the results, let me first offer a general statement about the
paper’s empirical contribution. In their article on exchange rate regimes
and growth, Eduardo Levy Yeyati and Federico Sturzenegger demonstrate
that developing countries with ﬁxed nominal exchange rate regimes grow,
on average, 0.7 percentage point per year more slowly than other coun-
tries.
1 In theory, a fixed nominal exchange rate need not translate into a
1. Eduardo Levy Yeyati and Federico Sturzenegger, “To Float or to Fix: Evidence on
the Impact of Exchange Rate Regimes on Growth,” American Economic Review 93, no. 4
(2003): 1173–93.
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documentation that countries with overvalued currencies grow more
slowly is not particularly novel.
What is new about the Rodrik paper is the demonstration that coun-
tries with undervalued currencies systematically grow faster. A 50 per-
cent undervaluation is associated with a ﬁve-year growth rate that is about
1.3 percentage points above the country-specific mean.
The paper tries hard to disentangle causation from correlation. Building
on his previous work with Ricardo Hausmann and Lant Pritchett,
2 Rodrik
examines the relationship between growth accelerations and undervalua-
tion, asking the following question: Conditional on experiencing a growth
acceleration, have countries done so with the help of an undervalued cur-
rency? In general, I applaud the use of an episodic approach to the data, but
the problem with the question being asked is that it selects episodes on
the basis of the desired outcome. Cutting the data in this way throws out
important information about the number of times that large real deprecia-
tions occurred without any growth acceleration following in due course.
Instead of picking growth acceleration episodes and examining under-
valuation relative to the beginning of those episodes, why not turn the
analysis on its head? Using an appropriate deﬁnition, one could identify
episodes of large sustained real depreciations and examine the time path
of economic growth and the allocation of real resources after the onset of
the depreciation. If the real exchange rate does indeed exert a causal effect,
one should observe faster growth and a shift of resources from the non-
tradable to the tradable sector.
Cutting the data on episodes of large real depreciations would also
focus attention on the important issue of levels versus changes. It is one
thing to say that countries grow faster when the real exchange rate is at
an undervalued level. But such a statement reveals nothing about the
optimal way to change the real exchange rate to reach a level at which
robust growth can occur. It would be useful to know if the way in which
a country’s currency becomes undervalued seems to matter for subsequent
growth outcomes.
For instance, the words “nominal devaluation” do not appear anywhere
in the paper. Yet a large nominal devaluation is one of the quickest ways
of achieving a real depreciation. In fact, Ilan Goldfajn and Rodrigo Valdes
have shown that most countries exit episodes of overvaluation not through
414 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
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the currency.
3 Of course, wage and price compression can do the job with-
out a devaluation. Disinﬂation reduces the domestic price level relative to
the international price level, but this process can take a long time and exact
a heavy cost in terms of lost output and higher unemployment.
The issue of how to change the real exchange rate raises the question of
why undervaluation produces faster growth in the first place. One’s nat-
ural inclination is to think that a competitive real exchange rate generates
growth through an improvement in the trade balance. But Rodrik argues
that the statistical relationship he uncovers between undervaluation and
growth is not simply a story of export-led growth. To explain why under-
valuation has an impact on growth, he therefore introduces an intermediate
goods version of the dependent economy model. The logic of the model
is straightforward. Absent any frictions, the real exchange rate settles at
a level that equalizes the marginal return of resource allocation in the trad-
able and the nontradable sectors, thereby maximizing their contribution
to growth. Associated with this optimality condition are the fractions of
resources that get devoted to the production of tradable and nontradable
goods.
The story changes in the presence of distortions, and the paper intro-
duces two of them: a tax that reduces producers’ rate of return to capital
in the tradable sector, and another tax that reduces the return to capital in
nontradables. We are told to think of these taxes as proxies for poor insti-
tutions. When the institutional tax on tradable and nontradable returns 
is the same, no real consequences ensue, as the fraction of resources
devoted to the tradable sector remains at its growth-maximizing level. The
key to the model, then, is that the institutional tax on returns in each sector
not be the same. For Rodrik’s story to work, one has to believe that poor
institutions are much more costly for the producers of traded goods.
It is not clear that this is true across the board. Although it is easy to
believe that a poor contracting environment hurts manufacturers more
than barbers, the comparison between manufacturing and construction,
for example, is less obvious. A major builder relies on many of the same
factors as a manufacturer: suppliers, subcontractors, customers, and ﬁnan-
cial and legal support. Even if one accepts Rodrik’s story that poor insti-
tutions have a disproportionately large negative effect on tradable goods,
the analysis comes up flat, because the paper does not provide a way of
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tion over all.
Without a means of quantifying the negative impact of distortions in the
contracting environment (or the positive impact of undervaluation), it is
not clear what policy conclusions to draw from the paper’s results. More
generally, although Rodrik demonstrates that temporarily faster growth is
one beneﬁt of undervaluation, the paper does not provide a welfare analy-
sis. This is important, because undervaluation has costs as well as beneﬁts.
To draw reliable policy conclusions, one needs to know more about the
costs of undervaluation and how they compare with the beneﬁts of faster
growth. There are at least two potential costs of real undervaluation.
First, undervaluation subsidizes producers in the tradable goods sector
at the expense of consumers. In the context of this model, which, as men-
tioned, never really discusses the nominal exchange rate, one can think
of undervaluation as roughly equivalent to a policy of forced saving.
Therefore, the critical question is whether one can conclude that faster
growth in this context is welfare enhancing. In other words, given the
population’s rate of time preference, are people made better off by con-
suming less today than they would otherwise choose? The answer is far
from clear, and I would add that this is more than a theoretical consider-
ation. If one is considering the impact on growth of a policy change such
as trade liberalization or the removal of capital controls, it is possible to
write down models in which strange, counterintuitive things happen and
aggregate welfare falls. But one has to try very hard to do that, because
when one moves from a scenario in which people have fewer choices
(closed markets) to one where they have more choices (open markets),
people are usually made better off. Introducing distortions, on the other
hand, generally reduces utility. In this case the distortion is that real under-
valuation interferes with the price signal that drives the relative produc-
tion and consumption of tradable and nontradable goods. Although it is
true that the distortion occurs in a second-best world, I do not think one
can conclude that welfare improves. Again, to make that case, one needs
to know just how great the benefits of undervaluation are relative to the
costs it imposes.
A second, well-known cost of a real undervaluation is that it gener-
ates destabilizing pressure on the balance of payments and attendant
inflationary pressure. Suppose that Mexico chooses to undervalue the
peso vis-à-vis the dollar. With Mexico’s nominal exchange rate, in terms
of pesos per dollar, set higher than the market clearing rate, Mexico will
run a chronic surplus in tradable goods. Those surpluses will generate a
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exchange rate is not allowed to adjust, the quantity of currency in circu-
lation will rise in concert with the excess demand for Mexican tradables.
If there is no adjustment in the exchange rate, over time the imbalance gets
reﬂected in rising reserves and inﬂation, unless the central bank is able to
successfully sterilize the inﬂow.
Some of Rodrik’s other research actually highlights the potentially large
welfare cost associated with accumulating excess foreign reserves.
4 Since
a policy of undervaluation is isomorphic to a policy of excess reserve accu-
mulation, I am surprised that the paper does not try to reconcile the appar-
ent inconsistency between the arguments in favor of undervaluation in this
paper with Rodrik’s earlier stance that emerging economies are overaccu-
mulating reserves.
It is also worth emphasizing that although small, open economies may
safely ignore the worldwide externalities of their policy choices, the
same cannot be said for large countries. For example, if Barbados were
to choose a policy of grossly undervaluing its currency, it could safely
assume that its policy choice would have a negligible impact on the world
balance of trade. The same assumption would be invalid for a large coun-
try. Furthermore, policies that are benign when implemented by a single
country may be harmful if pursued by many countries simultaneously.
From an individual country’s point of view, a policy of undervaluation
promotes export growth. But we all know very well the terrible externali-
ties associated with a world in which everyone tries to undervalue at once.
Whether this is done through a cascading series of competitive devalua-
tions or through tighter fiscal policy, the consequences are largely the
same. Rodrik likes to argue that countries need policy space. Such space is
often appropriate and beneﬁcial, but negative externalities of the type just
mentioned are precisely the reason we have international organizations
that try to encourage mutually beneficial exchange rate policies.
Turning from costs back to beneﬁts, one implication of the model is that
an outward transfer depreciates the currency. This real depreciation raises
the rate of return to capital in the nontradable sector, improves resource
allocation, and therefore acts as a second-best strategy for alleviating the
implicit tax associated with poor institutions. Rodrik justifies this policy
prescription on the grounds that foreign capital inﬂows do not contribute
to growth. The support for such a claim comes, in part, from the paper by
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in these pages about eighteen months ago.
5 There I outlined several rea-
sons why the data did not support the authors’ claims about the impact of
foreign capital on growth.
I will not repeat that discussion today. But I will say that the assertion
that capital inflows do nothing but fuel consumption booms does not
stand up to scrutiny. An article I published in the December 2007 issue
of the Journal of Economic Literature documents the mounting body of
evidence that foreign resource flows into developing countries reduce
their cost of capital, stimulate investment, and raise GDP per capita.
6
Similarly, in a recent working paper, Diego Sasson and I document the
large, positive impact of capital account liberalization on real wages and
productivity.
7
None of this is to say that capital account liberalization is the secret to
faster growth. In fact, I agree that the impact of capital inﬂows on the real
exchange rate can be a major source of concern for small, open economies.
Thailand’s struggle with the real appreciation of the baht—roughly 20 per-
cent against the dollar in 2006–07—provides an important case in point.
Furthermore, I agree with the argument that Rodrik has made elsewhere,
that emerging economies tend to rely too heavily on short-term debt. But
if the problem is an overreliance on short-term debt, the real exchange rate
is a rather indirect and blunt instrument for dealing with it. The principle of
policy targeting suggests that it is much more efﬁcient to address directly
the imperfections in the international financial system that give market
participants the incentive to accumulate large quantities of short-term debt
that are privately optimal but carry large negative consequences for the
general public.
Rodrik acknowledges that eliminating the institutional and market fail-
ures in question would be preferable to adopting policies that drive the real
exchange rate away from its equilibrium value. He argues, however, that
encouraging developing countries to improve their institutions amounts to
telling them that the way to get rich is to get rich.
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engaged in much hand wringing over the problem of “original sin,” with
some claiming that elaborate ﬁnancial engineering schemes were needed
to help developing countries avoid the problem of accumulating dollar-
denominated debt.
8 Developing countries, it was said, would need decades
to achieve the level of institutional development necessary to enable
them to issue debt denominated in their own currency. I argued that this
view not only was far too pessimistic but implicitly assumed that devel-
oping countries are incapable of helping themselves. I also said that once
developing country governments demonstrated a sustained commitment
to sound policies, they would have no trouble issuing local currency-
denominated debt.
9
Time has been kind to my prediction. A recent report by the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) demonstrates just how much progress has
been made on the development of local-currency bond markets.
10 Accord-
ing to the BIS, in 2000 the total stock of international emerging market
bonds outstanding was $498 billion; by 2005 that stock was $618 billion.
Subtracting the ﬁrst number from the second gives a rough estimate of the
cumulative amount of new international debt issued by emerging markets
from 2000 to 2005: $120 billion.
To gauge just how much the world has changed since 2000, consider the
analogous ﬁgures for local-currency-denominated emerging market bonds.
The BIS report tells us that at the end of 2000 the total stock of interna-
tionally issued emerging market bonds denominated in local currency was
$20 billion. By 2006 that stock had grown to $102 billion, which implies
that emerging markets issued $82 billion in such bonds between 2000 and
2006. In other words, almost 70 percent ($82 billion divided by $120 bil-
lion) of the internationally issued bonds of emerging market countries
between 2000 and 2005 were denominated in local currency. This is a
remarkable increase given that the market for such instruments was pre-
viously nonexistent.
A big reason behind the shift is the improved macroeconomic environ-
ment in emerging markets. In the words of the Committee on the Global
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mic policies, reliance on foreign currency debt has indeed been reduced
in almost all emerging market economies....  Issuance of local cur-
rency bonds has expanded substantially and domestic bond markets
have deepened.”
11
Policies matter. There is no inherent conﬂict between persuading coun-
tries not to overvalue their currencies and encouraging them to enhance
their institutional environments. Improving the material existence of mil-
lions of people around the world inevitably requires that governments
do both.
COMMENT BY
MICHAEL WOODFORD In this paper Dani Rodrik offers a provoca-
tive argument for policies that seek to maintain an “undervalued” cur-
rency in order to promote economic growth. The key to his argument is
the empirical evidence that he presents, indicating the correlation of his
measure of undervaluation with economic growth in cross-country panel
regressions.
Rodrik does not really discuss the measures that should be under-
taken to maintain an undervalued currency or whether it is likely that 
a country that pursues undervaluation as a growth strategy should be
able to maintain that undervaluation over time. For example, he remarks
(as justification for interest in the question of a causal effect of under-
valuation on growth) that “one of the key findings of the open-economy
macroeconomic literature is that . . . nominal exchange rates and real
exchange rates move quite closely together.” But although this is true,
and although it is widely interpreted as indicating that monetary policy
can affect real exchange rates (since it can obviously move nominal
rates), it hardly follows that monetary policy alone can maintain a weak
real exchange rate for long enough to serve as part of a long-run growth
strategy.
Indeed, conventional theoretical models with short-run price stickiness
that are perfectly consistent with the observed short-run effects of mone-
tary policy on real exchange rates also imply that monetary policy should
not have long-run effects. Rodrik also cites evidence showing that steril-
ized interventions in the foreign exchange market can affect real exchange
rates. But economic theory suggests that interventions not associated with
420 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
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more transitory effects. And the experiences of countries that have sought
to use devaluation to boost economic growth have often found that the real
exchange rate effect of a nominal devaluation is not long-lasting. The case
of South Korea, discussed below, is an example.
Nonetheless, the point of Rodrik’s paper is to provide evidence that
undervaluation favors growth, on the assumption that policies to maintain
undervaluation are available, and it is that central contention that I shall
examine here. I ﬁnd the evidence less persuasive than the paper suggests,
for two reasons. First, I believe that the paper exaggerates the strength and
robustness of the association between the real exchange rate and growth
in the cross-country evidence. And second, even granting the existence
of such a correlation, a causal effect of real exchange rates on growth is
hardly the only possible interpretation.
HOW STRONG IS THE ASSOCIATION OF UNDERVALUATION WITH ECONOMIC
GROWTH? Rodrik’s key result is the panel regression reported in his table
1, in which the coefﬁcient in a regression of growth on his UNDERVAL
measure is found to be signiﬁcantly positive and substantial in magnitude.
The relationship, he argues, is in fact conﬁned to developing countries, as
the coefﬁcient is near zero when the sample is restricted to countries with
GDP per capita greater than $6,000 a year; for the sample consisting only
of countries with incomes less than $6,000 a year, the coefﬁcient is both
larger and has an even larger t statistic.
However, it is quite possible that Rodrik’s measure of undervaluation
exaggerates this association. Apart from the constant and fixed-effect
terms, his measure of undervaluation is equal to
But since lagged income per capita is also included as a regressor in
Rodrik’s table 1 regressions, and since t refers to a ﬁve-year period in these
regressions, so that
his specification is equivalent to a regression of the growth rate (for
each country-date pair) on the variable ln RERit + 1.2 growthit and lagged
income per capita, and δ ˆ (the estimated coefﬁcient on ln UNDERVAL in his
regression) would be the coefﬁcient on the “growth-adjusted real exchange
rate” in the alternative speciﬁcation. This way of viewing Rodrik’s regres-
sion speciﬁcation makes it evident that a positive estimate of δ ˆ need not
growth RGDPCH RGDPCH it it i t ≡( ) − ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ − 15 1 ln ln , ,
( ) ln ln . ln . 10 2 4 UNDERVAL RER RGDPCH it it it =+
COMMENTS and DISCUSSION 421
11472-07b_Rodrik Comments_rev.qxd  3/6/09  1:21 PM  Page 421indicate any association between real exchange rates and growth at all—
it may simply reﬂect the positive correlation between the growth rate and
itself.
Rodrik defends the use of his constructed measure UNDERVAL on
the ground that it is necessary to correct for the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
One should expect a lower real exchange rate (more-expensive nontraded
goods) for higher-income countries, owing to this effect; Rodrik then
deﬁnes “undervaluation” as the degree to which a country’s real exchange
rate is higher than expected given the country’s income per capita. The
latter prediction is made by regressing ln RERit on ln RGDPCHit in a
panel regression with time effects but no country ﬁxed effects, so that the
correlation between countries’ average real exchange rates and their aver-
age incomes can be used to estimate the relationship. The coefﬁcient on
income per capita in this ﬁrst-stage regression is (the negative of) the 0.24
appearing in equation 1 above.
However, two objections must be raised to this argument. First,
Rodrik’s panel regressions in his table 1 already include country fixed
effects. Hence, average differences in the level of the real exchange rate
associated with particular countries (for example, the developing coun-
tries with low real exchange rates, for the reason explained by Balassa
and Samuelson) would have no consequences for the regression coeffi-
cient δ ˆ, even in the absence of Rodrik’s proposed “adjustment” of the
real exchange rate measure. A further adjustment is needed only if the
Balassa-Samuelson effect is expected to create a higher-frequency correla-
tion between income and the real exchange rate as well—that is, if the ﬁve-
year periods in which a country’s income per capita is relatively higher are
ones in which it should correspondingly have a relatively lower exchange
rate. The fact that the Balassa-Samuelson effect is well established as a
factor explaining long-run average differences between countries does not
make it obvious that such a high-frequency effect should be important. (As
a theoretical matter, this should be true only to the extent that it is also true
at higher frequencies that variations in the rate of productivity growth in
the production of tradables are an important source of variation in both
aggregate output growth, on the one hand, and the relative price of trad-
ables, on the other.)
Second, even supposing that the high-frequency Balassa-Samuelson
effect exists, the proposed correction will not necessarily be the correct
one and will generally introduce an upward bias in the estimated coefﬁ-
cient δ ˆ. The reason is that the Balassa-Samuelson effect is not a direct
422 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
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relative price of tradables). Instead, it is a mechanism according to which
both income and the relative price of tradables are affected by a third vari-
able (the rate of productivity growth in the tradable sector), which creates
a negative correlation between the two variables (to the extent that other
factors do not also simultaneously affect both variables).
The correction proposed by Rodrik would be appropriate if one
believed that income and the real exchange rate were determined by a
structural model of the form
where I now simply write E for the log of the real exchange rate and Y for
the log of income per capita, P is a policy variable (treated as exoge-
nous), and u and v are additional exogenous disturbances. Here equation 2
is a structural model of real exchange rate determination, in which the
term −βY represents the (high-frequency) “Balassa-Samuelson effect”
for which Rodrik apparently wishes to correct, and the term P indicates the
kind of policy that can inﬂuence the degree of undervaluation, the effects
of which upon growth Rodrik wishes to determine. Equation 3 is a struc-
tural model of income determination, in which the term dE represents the
growth effect of the real exchange rate as such (that is, independent of
what has caused the exchange rate to vary) hypothesized by Rodrik.
Although no such model is spelled out or defended, something of this form
is implicit in Rodrik’s empirical strategy.
Suppose that equations 2 and 3 are a correct model, and suppose further
that one has a strategy that allows one to identify the correct value of 
β (say, from the countries’ long-run differences in incomes and in real
exchange rates, on the supposition that there are no long-run cross-country
differences in the terms P or u).
1 Under these assumptions, the “adjusted”
real exchange rate
() 4  EE Y ≡+ β
() , 3 Yd Ev =+
() 2 EY P u =− + + β
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1. To simplify the discussion, I shall abstract from the problems created by the use of a
generated regressor and treat the true value of β as known with certainty.
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further simplifying assumption that v is orthogonal to u ˜, the coefﬁcient δ ˆ
from a regression of Y on E ˜ will be a consistent estimator of
This is precisely the interpretation that Rodrik wishes to give to his esti-
mate of δ ˆ.
But among the several assumptions required for this approach to yield a
consistent estimate of ∂Y / ∂P, note that the “Balassa-Samuelson effect” is
treated as a direct effect of Y on E in equation 2. In fact, this is not the
nature of the Balassa-Samuelson theory. Even if one considers the theory
as referring to purely instantaneous and static effects (which therefore
have the same quantitative form at all frequencies), the model should
instead be one of the form
where T is a measure of productivity in the tradable sector and, accord-
ing to the Balassa-Samuelson theory, the coefficients a and c are both
positive. Here P is again a policy that is hypothesized to directly affect
the exchange rate, and dE again indicates the hypothesized effect of
exchange rate variations (from whatever source) on national income. I
shall suppose that T is an exogenous disturbance, independent of all of the
factors P, u, and v.
Suppose now that the true structural model is of the form in equations 6
and 7, but that one is able to correctly estimate the elasticity of the real
exchange rate with respect to variations in income per capita due purely to
variations in productivity of the tradable sector, which is what one needs
for the Balassa-Samuelson adjustment proposed by Rodrik. That is, sup-
pose that one has a correct estimate of the coefﬁcient
(This could be estimated by a cross-country regression of long-run aver-
age real exchange rates on long-run average levels of income per capita,
under the assumption that there are no cross-country differences in the
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What will be the economic interpretation of the coefficient δ ˆ obtained
by regressing Y on E ˜? In particular, will it provide a consistent estimate
of ∂Y / ∂P?
Under the assumption that β is correctly estimated, E ˜ will be a measure
of “undervaluation” that has been purged of any effects of variations in the
productivity of the tradable sector; speciﬁcally,
In this sense one has controlled for variations in the real exchange rate due
to the Balassa-Samuelson effect. But this does not sufﬁce to make δ δ ˆ a con-
sistent estimate of ∂Y / ∂P. Even under the assumption (for simplicity) that
v is orthogonal to u ˜, δ ˆ is in this case a consistent estimate of
where δ is again deﬁned as in equation 5 and σ2 is the variance. But this
quantity is not equal to
for two distinct reasons. Even if σ2
v = 0, expression 8 will equal δ rather
than d, but because the Balassa-Samuelson effect is not a direct effect of
income on the exchange rate (as represented in equation 2), the policy-
relevant elasticity is d rather than δ. But, likely more important, if σ
2
v > 0,
the second term in expression 8 represents an upward bias in δ ˆ. One
would find a positive estimate for δ ˆ even if the true policy elasticity d
were equal to zero.
Not only is the coefficient obtained from a regression on E ˜ likely to
be biased; it is far from obvious that this should be a more reliable esti-
mate than would be obtained by simply regressing on the unadjusted real
exchange rate. Assuming again that v is orthogonal to u ˜, my simple model
implies that the coefﬁcient d ˆ obtained by regressing Y on E should be a
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σ
2
T > 0), owing to the failure to correct for the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
But the bias will be relatively small as long as
which is to say, as long as productivity growth in the tradable sector
accounts for a relatively small share of total high-frequency variation in
the exchange rate. This last assumption seems a fairly reasonable one,
except over quite long periods.
How dependent are Rodrik’s results on the use of the UNDERVAL mea-
sure? His table 3 presents results for corresponding panel regressions using
a variety of simple real exchange rate measures instead of his “adjusted”
measure. In most cases the measure of undervaluation is no longer a sig-
niﬁcant explanatory factor when the entire sample of countries is used.
Rodrik instead stresses that when one restricts attention to the sample of
developing countries, the coefﬁcient on the measure of undervaluation
remains significantly (at the 5 percent level or better) positive in three
out of the four cases (albeit substantially smaller than when UNDERVAL
is used).
These results indicate that within the sample of lower-income coun-
tries, there is a positive association between the level of the real exchange
rate and growth, after one controls for country effects and time effects;
Rodrik’s basic ﬁnding is not purely an artifact of the way in which his pre-
ferred measure of undervaluation is constructed. Nonetheless, if one were
to emphasize the results using the real exchange rate (as I would prefer),
one would not only obtain a smaller estimated effect, but have more reason
for concern for the robustness of the ﬁnding as well.
For example, when one uses the real exchange rate as the measure of
undervaluation, it becomes more important to restrict attention to the sam-
ple of “developing” countries in order to ﬁnd evidence of the association
between undervaluation and growth. But this in turn leads to questions
about what should deﬁne the sample of countries that are included. Table 1
illustrates the consequences for the value of the estimated coefﬁcient δ ˆ of
alternative choices of the set of countries included in the sample. Here the
measure of undervaluation used is the real exchange rate measure from
the Penn World Tables (the one used in the ﬁrst two columns of Rodrik’s
table 3).
2 The ﬁrst line of the table essentially replicates the result in
a Tu
22 2 σσ << ,
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2. Note that among the real exchange rate measures that Rodrik considers in table 3, this
is the one that results in the most signiﬁcant positive value for δ ˆ when the sample is restricted
to countries with income per capita less than $6,000.
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ﬁcient is reduced by one-third if the income cutoff is raised from $6,000 to
$8,000.
4 It is not obvious that only countries with income per capita less
than $6,000 should be regarded as developing countries; in particular, if
the justiﬁcation for expecting to observe the hypothesized relationship
only in lower-income countries is that these countries have weaker institu-
tions, it is not obvious that countries with incomes per capita between
$6,000 and $8,000 do not also suffer from many of the institutional weak-
nesses that are common in the developing world.
5 But the evidence for a
positive association between the real exchange rate and growth is con-
siderably weaker when these additional countries are included in the set
of “developing” countries. Moreover, the evidence becomes weaker still
if the lowest-income countries (those with income per capita less than
$1,000) are excluded from the sample. (One is surely not much interested
in using the experiences of these desperate countries as illustrations of a
successful growth strategy.) When these countries are dropped from the
sample (third line of table 1), the estimated effect is only about half as
large as for the “developing” sample used by Rodrik and no longer signiﬁ-
cant at the 5 percent level.
DOES THE CORRELATION INDICATE CAUSALITY? Even granting the existence
of a positive correlation between a country’s real exchange rate and its
growth rate, is it legitimate to interpret this as evidence of a causal effect
of the exchange rate on growth? In particular, is it evidence of a causal
mechanism that can be relied upon in predicting the effects of a policy of
seeking to maintain a depreciated currency?
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Table 1. Estimates of the Coefﬁcient on Rodrik’s Undervaluation Measure 
for Different Samples
Sample limited to countries 
with income per capita Coefﬁcient Standard error t statistic
Less than $6,000 0.0144 0.0038 3.77
Less than $8,000 0.0091 0.0037 2.50
Between $1,000 and $8,000 0.0077 0.0040 1.91
Source: Author’s calculations.
3. Rodrik reports a slightly larger coefﬁcient (0.016) and a t statistic of 3.74.
4. As in Rodrik’s regressions, the income level used in this classiﬁcation is average real
income per capita over the period 1950–2004, where real GDP per capita is taken from the
Penn World Tables.
5. The countries in this set are Bulgaria, Chile, Kazakhstan, Mauritius, Poland, South
Africa, South Korea, Swaziland, Taiwan, Turkmenistan, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
11472-07b_Rodrik Comments_rev.qxd  3/6/09  1:21 PM  Page 427I should begin by admitting that I suspect that at least some of the posi-
tive association found in the data does reﬂect episodes in which policies
that manipulate the exchange rate have had signiﬁcant consequences for
growth—speciﬁcally, examples of a familiar sort, in which policies that
maintain an overvalued currency create distortions that stiﬂe economic
activity. But Rodrik stresses that this well-known lesson is not the only
connection between exchange rate policy and growth; the declared pur-
pose of his paper is to establish that policies leading to undervaluation
are beneficial to growth. Yet much of the evidence that he presents (and
the only evidence using unadjusted measures of the real exchange rate)
consists of correlations that might largely reflect cases of overvaluation.
Beneficial effects of undervaluation on growth can hardly be established
merely by observing that countries are able to reduce their growth rates by
intervening to maintain an overvalued currency. For example, the policies
used to maintain a severe overvaluation typically involve rationing of
access to foreign exchange, and one may suppose that it is these controls,
rather than the level of the exchange rate as such, that account for much of
the reduction in economic performance; but if so, one can hardly argue on
this ground that other types of interference with free convertibility will
instead increase efficiency, as long as the controls keep the currency
undervalued rather than overvalued. One might instead expect growth to
be favored by a policy that does not create distortions of either sign.
Rodrik offers several comments on the issue of causality. The ﬁrst is an
assertion that although an inference of causality from real exchange rate
depreciation to growth would be problematic “in a world where govern-
ments did not care about the real exchange rate and left it to be determined
purely by market forces,” in fact “most governments pursue a variety of
policies with the explicit goal of affecting the real exchange rate.” But
there is a great leap between the observation that real exchange rates are
affected by policy and an assumption that the real exchange rate is purely
determined by policy, and by policies that are exogenous with respect to
the state of the economy at that. Yet only under the assumption that the real
exchange rate is an exogenous policy choice can one sidestep the issue of
causality.
In fact, Rodrik admits that endogeneity of the real exchange rate is an
issue, and he proposes two ways of dealing with it. One is an extension
of his regression model to include additional explanatory variables, such
as the inflation rate, government consumption as a share of GDP, and
gross domestic saving as a share of GDP. Inclusion of additional vari-
ables lowers the coefﬁcient δ δ ˆ on the UNDERVAL variable, but the coefﬁ-
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valuation does indeed have a positive effect on growth, even after one
has controlled for possible sources of endogenous variation in the real
exchange rate. In fact, Rodrik suggests that some of the endogenous varia-
tion in the exchange rate that has been controlled for ought really to be
counted as policy-induced variation: “To the extent that [policies that
reduce government consumption or increase saving] are designed to move
the real exchange rate in the ﬁrst place, they are part of what I have in mind
when I talk of ‘a policy of undervaluation.’” This last point, however, is
hardly convincing: if it is shown that policies that increase saving, for
example, increase economic growth even when policymakers adopt them
because of their anticipated consequences for the real exchange rate, it
would hardly follow that policymakers should therefore be advised to
attempt to depreciate by whatever means possible, for the growth effect of
the increased saving might occur through other channels than the effect on
the real exchange rate. Moreover, the mere fact that one has controlled for
some possible kinds of endogeneity of the real exchange rate is hardly a
proof that the remaining variation is exogenous.
Rodrik’s final argument is an assertion that “many of the plausible
sources of bias . . . would induce a negative relationship between under-
valuation and growth, not the positive relationship I have documented.”
This, in his view, makes an interpretation of the positive value of δ ˆ as
reflecting omitted-variable bias implausible. Accordingly, it is perhaps
worth discussing a simple example of how endogeneity of the real
exchange rate could result in a positive correlation between the real
exchange rate and growth, even under circumstances where devaluation
would not stimulate economic activity at all.
I shall illustrate my point using a purposely oversimpliﬁed model of
equilibrium real exchange rate determination.
7 Consider a two-period (t =
1, 2) small, open economy model with two sectors ( j = T, N) producing
tradables and nontradables, respectively. I assume a competitive world
market for the T good (which will also be the numeraire) and a world real
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6. Of course, this robustness of the signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcient may reﬂect the bias
resulting from use of the UNDERVAL measure, discussed above.
7. In particular, my use here of a model in which monetary policy cannot affect the real
exchange rate does not mean that I believe that, in reality, monetary policy cannot inﬂuence
the real exchange rate, at least for a time. My point is simply to show that a positive empiri-
cal correlation between the real exchange rate and real activity need not imply anything
about the magnitude of the growth effects of exchange rate policy, and that point is made
most simply with a model in which there is no scope at all for monetary policy to affect real
variables, even in the short run.
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unaffected by the net capital ﬂows of the small country. Let the production
technology in each sector j and each period t be of the Cobb-Douglas form,
where Kjt is the capital stock in sector j, Hjt is hours of labor in that sector,
and the coefﬁcient 0 < αj < 1 may be sector speciﬁc. The initial capital
stocks Kj1 of both sectors are given as parameters, and I assume that KN2,
the capital stock of the N sector in the second period, is given exogenously
as well. (To simplify, I shall assume a constant exogenous value, KNt = KN,
for both periods t.) The second-period capital stock of the tradable sector
instead depends on investment spending I, according to the law of motion
where 0 < δ < 1 is the rate of depreciation of capital in the T sector.
I assume that the representative household in the small economy seeks
to maximize
where the contribution to utility U in period t is of the form
in which expression Cjt is consumption in period t of the sector j good, Ht
is hours worked, and the preference parameters satisfy λ, v > 0 and 0 < β,
γ < 1. For simplicity I assume competitive domestic spot markets each
period for both labor and the N good, neither of which is traded inter-
nationally. Finally, the government sets the nominal exchange rate each
period, which then determines the domestic-currency price of the T good
in that period (by the law of one price). I shall suppose that the govern-
ment also imposes a proportional tax τ on savings in period 1, so that the
real return received by domestic savers is (1 −τ )(1 + r). I abstract from
government consumption; the government revenue raised by the tax is
assumed to be simply rebated as a lump sum to households.
In any period t, given values for (KTt, YTt), one can solve uniquely for
equilibrium values of HTt, HNt, YNt = CNt, CTt, wt, and PNt, where both the
wage wt and the price of nontradables PNt are quoted in units of the T good.
(Thus, wt is a real wage and PNt is actually the relative price of nontrad-
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for each of these variables and that the solution functions satisfy (among
other properties)
Using these solution functions, an intertemporal equilibrium can then be
described as a set of values for the endogenous variables (YT1, KT2, YT2) that
satisfy the following three equilibrium conditions:
given values of the exogenous parameters (KT1, r, β ˜), where β ˜ ≡β (1 − r).
Here equation 9 is the requirement that there be intertemporal balance
in the country’s capital account (assuming zero net foreign assets at the
beginning of period 1); equation 10 is the Euler equation for an optimal
saving decision by the representative household; and equation 11 is the
ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt-maximizing investment demand, stating that
the anticipated marginal product of capital in period 2 must equal 1 plus
the required real rate of return.
8 One can again show that there is a unique
solution to these three equations for the endogenous variables as differen-
tiable functions of the exogenous parameters.
Consider now the consequences of an exogenous increase in the com-
posite parameter β ˜ , which implies an increase in domestic households’
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8. Note that since period 2 is the last period of the model, there is effectively 100 percent
depreciation of capital in this period.
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increase in β) or a change in policy that increases incentives for saving (a
reduction in τ). Total differentiation of the system of equations 9, 10, and
11 reveals that
which implies in turn that
Hence an increase in the willingness to save in period 1 (whether due to
changing attitudes or to changing incentives) will simultaneously increase
the production of tradables (YT1), the small country’s exports (YT1 − CT1),
and its real GDP (GDP1), while reducing the relative price of nontradables
(PN1) and hence increasing the real exchange rate.
Note that this equilibrium scenario resembles the phenomenon often
interpreted as “export-led growth”: a real depreciation coincides with an
increase in exports and an increase in total GDP (hence an increase in
the growth rate). Moreover, if one were to compare a panel of small,
open economies, to each of which the above model applies, with identical
parameter values except for cross-country variation in the value of β ˜, one
would observe a positive correlation between a country’s real exchange
rate in period 1 and its growth rate in that period.
9 Yet the high-growth
countries would not be in this situation because of their exchange rate poli-
cies; their higher growth rates would be due to other factors (factors that
favor a higher saving rate) that happen to lead both to a lower equilibrium
real exchange rate and to higher GDP growth. Moreover, the model is one
in which if a country were to use monetary policy to depreciate its cur-
rency in nominal terms, this would not affect growth (or any other real
variables, including the real exchange rate); it would only raise the nomi-
nal domestic prices of both tradables and nontradables (without affecting
their relative price).
It is true that there is a policy intervention, in the simple model, that
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9. The exogenous parameters taking identical values for the different countries are
assumed to include GDP in the period immediately before period 1, with respect to which
the period 1 growth rate is calculated.
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policy change would increase GDP (through its effect on saving) in the
same way that an increase in households’ patience would. But it does not
really make sense to call this a demonstration that a deliberate policy of
exchange rate depreciation can be used to stimulate growth, since the
most obvious example of a policy with that intent would be completely
ineffective.
10
The example shows that it is certainly possible for an omitted variable
to move both the real exchange rate and GDP in the same direction, so that
this is a potential interpretation of a positive coefﬁcient δ ˆ in Rodrik’s panel
regression. But is this theoretical possibility likely to be of practical rele-
vance? Here it is worth noting that the regressions reported in Rodrik’s
table 10 show that a country’s ratio of gross domestic saving to GDP has
a significant positive effect on his UNDERVAL measure; and of course,
a higher saving rate is also correlated with higher growth, as many authors
have noted, and as Rodrik’s panel regressions in tables 4 and 5 show. (The
latter regressions show that the saving rate is a significant variable in
explaining differences in growth across country-time pairs, even when the
undervaluation measure is also included in the regression, and that inclu-
sion of the saving rate as an explanatory variable reduces the estimated
coefﬁcient on the undervaluation measure.)
Rodrik notes that the inclusion of the saving rate in the growth regres-
sions does not completely eliminate the signiﬁcance of UNDERVAL as an
explanatory variable, and he concludes from this that endogeneity result-
ing from factors of the kind illustrated in the simple example do not fully
account for the association between undervaluation and growth. But the
fact that inclusion of a single proxy for factors of the kind represented
by the simple example eliminates only part of the association between
UNDERVAL and growth hardly establishes that endogenous mechanisms
of this kind are not responsible for the correlation—in particular, for the
cases in which undervaluation coincides with strong growth, as opposed to
the cases in which overvaluation coincides with weak growth.
11
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10. Moreover, some other policies that would result in a real depreciation as a byproduct
would lower rather than raise GDP growth.
11. Again, it is only the association of UNDERVAL with growth that is shown to be
robust to inclusion of the saving rate in the regression, not the association between simple
measures of the real exchange rate and growth. One should not expect the association
between UNDERVAL and growth to be completely eliminated by the inclusion of any num-
ber of regressors representing determinants of the real exchange rate, because UNDERVAL
also reﬂects the economy’s growth rate, as explained above.
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existence of a positive correlation between the real exchange rate and
growth (across some class of developing countries) need not be evidence
of any greater distortions in the tradable sector that can in turn justify
policies that essentially subsidize that sector. Ultimately, this is Rodrik’s
argument for the pursuit of undervaluation: one would like to subsidize the
production of tradables, but for political economy reasons it may be most
practical to do so by manipulating the exchange rate rather than through
industrial policy. The main evidence Rodrik offers for the hypothesis of
an inefficiently small relative size of the tradable sector in developing
economies is the evidence for a stimulative effect of a real depreciation.
Yet in the simple model, a positive correlation exists between the real
exchange rate and growth—and faster growth is associated with a shift of
resources from the nontradable to the tradable sector—but this does not
mean that the equilibrium production of tradables is suboptimal. In the
case that τ=0, the intertemporal equilibrium maximizes the welfare of the
representative household (subject to the constraint that trade with the rest
of the world must satisfy intertemporal balance of the capital account), and
the introduction of a subsidy for the production of tradables would reduce
welfare, relative to that optimum. Similarly, the introduction of other sorts
of market distortions that represent indirect ways of subsidizing the trad-
able sector would most likely reduce welfare, whether or not they would
increase GDP.
A CASE STUDY: SOUTH KOREA. Ultimately, the issue of causality is un-
likely to be settled using panel regressions of the kind that constitute
Rodrik’s main results, owing to a lack of suitable instruments for exoge-
nous changes in exchange rate policy. Case studies can often be more illu-
minating in this regard. Here I consider only one, that of South Korea,
which is one of the countries Rodrik cites to illustrate the association of
growth with undervaluation (see his figure 1). One can obtain a more
complete picture of the degree to which the Korean case supports Rodrik’s
thesis by looking at higher-frequency data (his figure 1 uses five-year
averages) and at additional variables.
My figure 1 plots annual data for both the (official) nominal won-
dollar exchange rate and the implied real exchange rate, as well as
Korean prices relative to U.S. prices.
12 The figure shows the several
large won devaluations of the 1950s and 1960s—in particular, those 
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12. The data are from the Penn World Tables and are the same data used by Rodrik in
constructing the UNDERVAL measure that he plots.
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13 Each of these did result (at least tem-
porarily) in a substantial real depreciation, providing clear evidence that
at least some of the relatively high frequency variation in the real
exchange rate in South Korea represents effects of exchange rate policy.
But the figure also makes clear that devaluations need not have any
long-lasting effect on the real exchange rate: much of the effect of the
1955 and 1961 devaluations had already been undone by increased inﬂa-
tion two years later. Indeed, this fact explains why the Korean govern-
ment found additional large devaluations to be necessary so soon after the
previous ones.
The 1964 devaluation might appear to have been more successful: for
the next decade, Korea maintained a real exchange rate that was substan-
tially weaker than it had been during most of the 1950s. Of course, this was
also the decade over which Korea’s real GDP growth accelerated to a rate
of 6 to 8 percent a year (ﬁgure 2), which Rodrik interprets as supporting
the view that an undervalued currency was the key to the Korean growth
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Figure 1. South Korea: Exchange Rates and Relative Prices, 1953–2004a
13. A 30 percent devaluation in February 1960 was followed by another 100 percent
devaluation in February 1961; the annual data are not of high enough frequency to show this
as two distinct episodes.
Source: Penn World Tables.
a. Exchange rates are against the dollar; a rise indicates a depreciation of the won.
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1964 devaluation, one must explain why earlier devaluations did not have
similarly long-lasting effects.
An obvious interpretation would be as follows: the earlier devaluations
were not associated with any change in the equilibrium real exchange
rate, and therefore monetary policy could weaken the real exchange rate
only temporarily; in contrast, the 1964 devaluation coincided with a
weakening of the equilibrium real rate, so that the devaluation, rather than
resulting in a true undervaluation, facilitated a shift in the real exchange
rate that would have had to occur in any event. Why might the equili-
brium real exchange rate have weakened? A clue is provided by the 
fact that gross domestic saving surged after the early 1960s, as figure 2
also shows.
Before 1965, ceilings on bank deposit rates in South Korea depressed
household saving, since (under the high inﬂation of the time) the implied
real interest rates on deposits were negative. Instead, households lent
funds to the informal ﬁnancial sector, where interest rates were quite high.
By raising interest rate ceilings in 1965 and at the same time reducing
inﬂation, the government brought household savings back into the bank-
ing system, and so reduced the cost of capital for businesses through more
436 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008
Figure 2. South Korea: Exchange Rates, Saving, and Economic Growth, 1953–2004
Source: Penn World Tables.
a. Logarithm of the real exchange rate from figure 1, divided by 10.
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11472-07b_Rodrik Comments_rev.qxd  3/6/09  1:21 PM  Page 436efﬁcient intermediation.14 In addition, tighter ﬁscal policy increased pub-
lic saving, further contributing to the sharp increase in overall domestic
saving.
This increase in saving, which coincided fairly closely with the
acceleration of economic growth, was likely an important cause of the
growth miracle. Moreover, the simple model presented above shows that
increased incentives for saving can also increase the equilibrium real
exchange rate. This may be one of the reasons that Korea’s equilibrium
real exchange rate was higher in the late 1960s and early 1970s than ear-
lier, so that the effects of the 1964 devaluation on the real exchange rate
were not quickly reversed. Indeed, Kwang Suk Kim argues that Korea’s
persistent current account deﬁcit and buildup of external debt in the decade
after 1965 point to overvaluation, not undervaluation, of the won in this
period (providing, incidentally, a further reason to doubt the accuracy of
Rodrik’s UNDERVAL measure).
15
Of course, my interpretation of the Korean case does not imply that
exchange rate policy is completely irrelevant to a country’s development
strategy. Overly tight regulation of ﬁnancial ﬂows can be an important
impediment to growth, as seems to have been the case in Korea before the
1960s, and policies that seek to maintain an overvalued currency will often
require extensive controls. Hence the creation of conditions conducive to
growth will mean, among other things, refraining from attempts to main-
tain a seriously overvalued currency. Moreover, the Korean case shows
that the process of development may involve a reduction in the equilib-
rium real exchange rate (that is, that which would result from fully flex-
ible wages and prices and an absence of impediments to capital ﬂows). In
such a case, a nominal devaluation can be valuable as a way of allowing
the necessary real depreciation to occur without the more painful process
of forcing wages and prices down in response to insufficient aggregate
demand. But such a policy is not correctly described as the pursuit of an
“undervalued” currency; rather, it is again an example of the wisdom of
avoiding overvaluation, with the important proviso that the equilibrium
exchange rate, with respect to which overvaluation must be deﬁned, can
easily change as the economic structure changes.
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sures, and Import-Liberalization Program.” In Economic Development in the Republic of
Korea: A Policy Perspective, edited by Lee-Jay Cho and Yoon Hyung Kim (Honolulu: East-
West Center, 1991, p. 137).
15. Kim, “The 1964–65 Exchange Rate Reform,” p. 132.
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ﬁndings of the paper are correct, the implications are striking: mercantil-
ism is the right economic strategy for developing countries seeking faster
growth. According to the paper, certain sectors of the economy are likely
to generate externalities and contribute to growth in ways different from
other sectors, and therefore policies that support those sectors are likely to
be preferred. This argument is directly at odds with economists’ traditional
opposition to most forms of industrial policy. But Summers raised two
problems that prevented him from being persuaded by the paper’s results.
First, he questioned whether the externalities in the tradable goods sector
could be so large relative to those in the nontradable goods sector as to
account for the estimated growth effect. Second, he doubted that all the
beneﬁts of such externalities would be realized within just ﬁve years, as
the paper’s empirical approach implied. Summers also criticized Rodrik’s
use of both time ﬁxed effects and ﬁve-year measurement periods, on the
grounds that they would likely obscure the longer-term impact. He argued
that omitting the country ﬁxed effects would allow a closer examination of
permanent differences in the structure of national economies.
Richard Cooper broadly agreed with Rodrik’s conclusion but observed
that it was not a new idea: many of the Asian countries had adopted it in
the second half of the twentieth century. Those countries followed a policy
of currency undervaluation for two reasons: to promote reliable demand
for their exports, and to encourage capital imports. Cooper disagreed
with Summers that such a policy constituted mercantilism: mercanti-
lism focuses on restricting imports, whereas this policy acts primarily on
exports. On a more technical note, Cooper expressed reservations about
the use of purchasing power parity–adjusted prices in determining over-
or undervaluation, given that those numbers are subject to significant
revision.
Linda Goldberg commended the paper for attempting to grapple with
the distortions limiting growth in developing countries, particularly those
falling disproportionately on the industrial sector. However, she objected
to the paper’s exclusive focus on the real exchange rate as the mechanism
for dealing with those distortions, since the real exchange rate is correlated
with other policies and macroeconomic variables. She suggested look-
ing instead at natural experiments directly related to industrial policy and
focusing speciﬁcally on the sectors most affected by the distortions.
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas cautioned against the use of the Penn World
Tables as the main data source. Given the large changes in the most recent
revision of the data, he suggested, as a robustness test, rerunning the
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also questioned the practice of deﬁning the real exchange rate as the rela-
tive price of goods in the tradable and the nontradable sectors, since other
literature has shown that movement in the real exchange rate is not driven
by movements in these relative prices. He added that he would like to see
more empirical evidence in support of the paper’s main argument.
Kathryn Dominguez agreed with previous speakers about the role of
undervaluation in overcoming distortions but added that maintaining a real
undervaluation is a costly policy. She requested that Rodrik provide an
explanation of how undervaluation should be achieved so that it is actually
beneﬁcial.
Frederic Mishkin discussed other possible mechanisms for encouraging
growth, focusing primarily on improvements in institutions. A shift in out-
put toward tradable goods creates incentives to improve institutions, par-
ticularly in the ﬁnancial sector, to meet the need for additional capital.
Such improvement leads to growth in other sectors as well, as previous lit-
erature has shown.
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